

Buffett's Letters To Berkshire Shareholders 1988	巴菲特致股东的信 1988 年
<p>Our gain in net worth during 1988 was \$569 million, or 20.0%. Over the last 24 years (that is, since present management took over), our per-share book value has grown from \$19.46 to \$2,974.52, or at a rate of 23.0% compounded annually.</p>	<p>本公司 1988 年的净值增加了五亿六千九百万美元, 较去年增加了 20.0%, 而过去 24 年以来(自从现有经营阶层接手后), 每股净值从 19 元成长到现在的 2,974 美元, 年复合成长率约为 23.0%。</p>
<p>We e emphasized in past reports that what counts, however, is intrinsic business value – the figure, necessarily an estimate, indicating what all of our constituent businesses are worth. By our calculations, Berkshire intrinsic business value significantly exceeds its book value. Over the 24 years, business value has grown somewhat faster than book value; in 1988, however, book value grew the faster, by a bit.</p>	<p>在过去的年报中我们一再强调真正重要的是企业的真实价值, 它代表着我们旗下企业组成份子到底值多少钱? 这个数字绝对是个估计数, 根据我们内部的估算, 目前伯克希尔真实的价值已大幅超越其帐面价值, 过去 24 年以来, 企业价值成长的速度一直要比帐面价值成长的幅度要高一点, 但在 1988 年情况有点不同, 后者增加的幅度略高于前者。</p>
<p>Berkshire past rates of gain in both book value and business value were achieved under circumstances far different from those that now exist. Anyone ignoring these differences makes the same mistake that a baseball manager would were he to judge the future prospects of a 42-year-old center fielder on the basis of his lifetime batting average.</p>	<p>过去伯克希尔真实与帐面价值成长的背景, 与现在有很大的不同, 若搞不清楚其间的差异, 就好象是一位棒球教练在判断高龄 42 岁的中外野手未来潜力时, 以他一生的平均打击率作为判断依据。</p>
<p>Important negatives affecting our prospects today are: (1) a less attractive stock market than generally existed over the past 24 years; (2) higher corporate tax rates on most forms of investment income; (3) a far more richly-priced market for the acquisition of businesses; and (4) industry conditions for Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., GEICO Corporation, and The Washington Post Company – Berkshire three permanent investments, constituting about one-half of our net worth – that range from slightly to materially less favorable than those existing five to ten years ago. All of these companies have superb management and strong properties. But, at current prices, their upside potential looks considerably less exciting to us today than it did some years ago.</p>	<p>今日我们所面临不利的因素主要有: (1) 目前的股票市场过热, 股价相对偏高 (2) 企业投资利益的税负过高 (3) 企业被购并的价格偏高 (4) 伯克希尔主要三大投资事业(约占本公司净值的一半)——资本城/ABC、GEICO 汽车保险与华盛顿邮报, 个别的产业状况多多少少不若以往, 虽然这些公司有杰出的管理与强势的资产, 但以目前的股价来看, 他们向上成长的潜力相对有限。</p>

<p>The major problem we face, however, is a growing capital base. You've heard that from us before, but this problem, like age, grows in significance each year. (And also, just as with age, it's better to have this problem continue to grow rather than to have it solved.)</p>	<p>然而我们面对的主要问题还是不断增加的资金规模，先前各位也听过类似的说明，不过这个问题就好像是一个人的身体健康与年纪的关系一样，随着时间的流逝，问题也越严重，（当然在这种情况下，我们是希望这个问题越严重越好）</p>
<p>Four years ago I told you that we needed profits of \$3.9 billion to achieve a 15% annual return over the decade then ahead. Today, for the next decade, a 15% return demands profits of \$10.3 billion. That seems like a very big number to me and to Charlie Munger, Berkshire Vice Chairman and my partner. (Should that number indeed prove too big, Charlie will find himself, in future reports, retrospectively identified as the senior partner.)</p>	<p>四年前我曾告诉各位若在未来十年，伯克希尔想要每年维持15%的报酬，我们总共约要有39亿美元的获利，时至今日，这个数字暴增到103亿美元，对查理与我来说，这实在是无法承担之重，（当然若这个数字事后发现真的过大，大家或许会在以后的报告中，查理可能会另外个别署名资深合伙人）</p>
<p>As a partial offset to the drag that our growing capital base exerts upon returns, we have a very important advantage now that we lacked 24 years ago. Then, all our capital was tied up in a textile business with inescapably poor economic characteristics. Today part of our capital is invested in some really exceptional businesses.</p>	<p>虽然资金规模会影响到最后的投资报酬率，但同时我们也拥有另外一项以前没有的优势，过去我们大部分的资金都被绑在没有多大经济效益的纺织事业之上，如今部份的资金已转移到一些相当不错的事业。</p>
<p>Last year we dubbed these operations the Sainted Seven: Buffalo News, Fechheimer, Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart, Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, See's, and World Book. In 1988 the Saints came marching in. You can see just how extraordinary their returns on capital were by examining the historical-cost financial statements on page 45, which combine the figures of the Sainted Seven with those of several smaller units. With no benefit from financial leverage, this group earned about 67% on average equity capital.</p>	<p>去年我将他们取名叫做七个圣徒 &#0;水牛城日报、费区海默、寇比吸尘器、内布拉斯加家具量贩店、史考特费兹制造集团、喜斯糖果及世界百科全书等，今年七圣徒持续向前迈进，大家可以发现以历史投资成本的角度来看，他们的投资报酬实在是惊人，没有依靠财务杠杆，平均股东权益报酬率高达67%。</p>
<p>In most cases the remarkable performance of these units arises partially from an exceptional business franchise; in all cases an exceptional management is a vital factor. The contribution Charlie and I make is to leave these managers alone.</p>	<p>虽然其中一部分的企业本身就是属于强势的企业，但优良的管理却是绝对必要的条件，查理跟我唯一可以做的就是让他们放手去干。</p>
<p>In my judgment, these businesses, in aggregate, will continue to produce superb returns. We</p>	<p>根据我个人的判断，这些企业总的来说，应该还会持续有好的表现，我们</p>

<p>I need these: Without this help Berkshire would not have a chance of achieving our 15% goal. You can be sure that our operating managers will deliver; the question mark in our future is whether Charlie and I can effectively employ the funds that they generate.</p>	<p>想要在往后年度继续维持 15% 报酬率的目标，绝对需要他们的支持，唯一的关键在于查理跟我是否能够有效地运用他们所贡献出来源源不绝的资金。</p>
<p>In that respect, we took a step in the right direction early in 1989 when we purchased an 80% interest in Borsheim , a jewelry business in Omaha. This purchase, described later in this letter, delivers exactly what we look for: an outstanding business run by people we like, admire, and trust. It a great way to start the year.</p>	<p>在这点我们做出了一个正确的决定，那就是买下位于奥玛哈 Borsheim 珠宝 80% 的股权，这项购并案会在后面说明，与我们当初的预期相符，一家优秀的企业由我们所欣赏且信任的人来经营，今年有一个好的开始。</p>
<p>Accounting Changes</p>	<p>会计原则变动</p>
<p>We have made a significant accounting change that was mandated for 1988, and likely will have another to make in 1990. When we move figures around from year to year, without any change in economic reality, one of our always-thrilling discussions of accounting is necessary.</p>	<p>1988 年开始有一项重要的会计原则变动开始适用，展望 1990 年还会有一项变动，当经济现况没有改变，但会计帐面却必须将数字搬来搬去，我们一定会花一番工夫讨论一下影响层面。</p>
<p>First, I l offer my customary disclaimer: Despite the shortcomings of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), I would hate to have the job of devising a better set of rules. The limitations of the existing set, however, need not be inhibiting: CEOs are free to treat GAAP statements as a beginning rather than an end to their obligation to inform owners and creditors – and indeed they should. After all, any manager of a subsidiary company would find himself in hot water if he reported barebones GAAP numbers that omitted key information needed by his boss, the parent corporation CEO. Why, then, should the CEO himself withhold information vitally useful to <i>his</i> bosses – the shareholder-owners of the corporation?</p>	<p>首先我习惯性的提出拒绝声明，虽然一般公认会计原则确有缺点，但我却必须坦承没有能力重新订出一套新的规则，虽然这套原则确有其先天性的限制，却不必就此废除，CEO 大可以也应该将一般公认会计原则当作是对股东与债权人尽告知义务的开始而非结束；若他们只是提供阳春的财务报表，却没有附上经营分析所必要的关键讯息，部门经理人会发现会被总经理修理的很惨，同样的母公司的总经理是不是也应该向他的老板，也就是公司股东所有人，报告必要有用的信息。</p>
<p>What needs to be reported is data – whether GAAP, non-GAAP, or extra-GAAP – that helps financially-literate readers answer three key questions: (1) Approximately how much is this company worth? (2) What is the likelihood that it can meet its future obligations? and (3) How good a job are its managers doing, given the hand</p>	<p>真正需要的是资料；不管是一般公认、非一般公认或是一般公认以外，可以帮助财务报表使用者可以了解三个问题：(1) 这家公司大概价值多少？(2) 它达到未来目标的可能性有多大？(3) 在现有条件下，经理人的工作表现如何？</p>

they have been dealt?	
In most cases, answers to one or more of these questions are somewhere between difficult and impossible to glean from the minimum GAAP presentation. The business world is simply too complex for a single set of rules to effectively describe economic reality for all enterprises, particularly those operating in a wide variety of businesses, such as Berkshire.	大部分的情况下，简单的财务数字并不能回答以上的问题，商业世界实在很难用一套简单的规则有效地来解释企业的经济实质状况，尤其是像伯克希尔这种由许多各种不同产业组成集团。
Further complicating the problem is the fact that many managements view GAAP not as a standard to be met, but as an obstacle to overcome. Too often their accountants willingly assist them. (How much, says the client, is two plus two?? Replies the cooperative accountant, What number did you have in mind?? Even honest and well-intentioned managements sometimes stretch GAAP a bit in order to present figures they think will more appropriately describe their performance. Both the smoothing of earnings and the pig bath?quarter are white lie? techniques employed by otherwise upright managements.	更复杂的是许多管理阶层不把一般公认会计原则当作是应该达到的标准，而是应该要克服的阻碍，且大多数的会计师也心甘情愿给予协助，当客户问到二加二等于几？配合的会计师可能会回答：“那要看你想要多少？”即使是诚实且正直的管理阶层有时也会超越一般公认会计原则，以使得报表数字更符合他们认为应该有的表现，不管是让损益平滑一点或是某季特别突出，都是还算正直的经营阶层经常运用的做帐技巧。
Then there are managers who actively use GAAP to deceive and defraud. They know that many investors and creditors accept GAAP results as gospel. So these charlatans interpret the rules imaginatively?and record business transactions in ways that technically comply with GAAP but actually display an economic illusion to the world.	另外还有一些不肖经理人专门利用一般公认会计原则来进行欺骗与贪污，他们很清楚许多投资人与债权人把一般公认会计原则当作圣经朝拜，所以这些骗徒运用丰富的想象力技巧性让交易记录符合一般公认会计原则，但却与实际的经济实质背道而驰。
As long as investors - including supposedly sophisticated institutions - place fancy valuations on reported earnings?that march steadily upward, you can be sure that some managers and promoters will exploit GAAP to produce such numbers, no matter what the truth may be. Over the years, Charlie and I have observed many accounting-based frauds of staggering size. Few of the perpetrators have been punished; many have not even been censured. It has been far safer to steal large sums with a pen than small sums with a gun.	只要投资人，包含看起来复杂的专业投资机构，迷信稳定向上攀升的盈余数字，我们可以百分之百确定还会有经理人与拥护者不顾现实，继续滥用一般公认会计原则来满足投资人的需求，多年以来查理跟我看到许多会计诈骗案，鲜少有人因此被惩罚，有的甚至都没有被发现，用笔偷钱要比用枪抢劫要来的容易的多。
Under one major change mandated by GAAP for 1988,	1988年一般公认会计原则有一个很

<p>we have been required to fully consolidate all our subsidiaries in our balance sheet and earnings statement. In the past, Mutual Savings and Loan, and Scott Fetzer Financial (a credit company that primarily finances installment sales of World Book and Kirby products) were consolidated on a one-line basis. That meant we (1) showed our equity in their combined net worths as a single-entry asset on Berkshire consolidated balance sheet and (2) included our equity in their combined annual earnings as a single-line income entry in our consolidated statement of earnings. Now the rules require that we consolidate each asset and liability of these companies in our balance sheet and each item of their income and expense in our earnings statement.</p>	<p>重大的转变，依新规定伯克希尔必须将子公司与关系企业的资产与损益完全并到母公司的财务报表之上，在过去互助储贷与史考特费兹金融(主要从事世界百科全书与寇比吸尘器分期付款的信用公司)，只须一次认列投资损益即可，意思是说(1)仅将被投资公司净值按投资比例以投资权益显示在伯克希尔的合并资产负债表之上(2)仅将被投资公司年度损益按投资比例以投资利益显示在伯克希尔的合并损益表之上，但是现在我们必须将被投资公司的资产与负债、营收与费用，放进合并的财务报表之上。</p>
<p>This change underscores the need for companies also to report segmented data: The greater the number of economically diverse business operations lumped together in conventional financial statements, the less useful those presentations are and the less able investors are to answer the three questions posed earlier. Indeed, the only reason we ever prepare consolidated figures at Berkshire is to meet outside requirements. On the other hand, Charlie and I constantly study our segment data.</p>	<p>这项转变低估了公司也要报告部门别信息，企业形态越复杂的公司，其按传统财务报表所加总出来的数字越没有意义，越没有办法让投资人回答前面所提的三个问题，事实上在伯克希尔我们会准备合并数字的唯一原因就是符合外部规定，查理跟我看的是另一套部门别的信息。</p>
<p>Now that we are required to bundle more numbers in our GAAP statements, we have decided to publish additional supplementary information that we think will help you measure both business value and managerial performance. (Berkshire's ability to discharge its obligations to creditors - the third question we listed - should be obvious, whatever statements you examine.) In these supplementary presentations, we will not necessarily follow GAAP procedures, or even corporate structure. Rather, we will attempt to lump major business activities in ways that aid analysis but do not swamp you with detail. Our goal is to give you important information in a form that we would wish to get it if our roles were reversed.</p>	<p>现在我们被要求在财务报表上将更多的数字混在一起，我们现在决定公布更多的补充信息，有助于帮助各位来衡量企业价值与管理当局的表现，伯克希尔将责任转移给债权人的能力；我们提到的第三个问题，应该很明确，不管是在看什么样的报表，在这些补充信息中，我们不会一定会依照一般公认会计原则，甚至不会以公司别来区分，相反地我们会试着将同性质的企业汇总有助于大家分析而不是被一大堆信息所淹没，我们的目标是设身处地的为各位设想，给各位我们认为重要的讯息。</p>

<p>On pages 41-47 we show separate combined balance sheets and earnings statements for: (1) our subsidiaries engaged in finance-type operations, which are Mutual Savings and Scott Fetzer Financial; (2) our insurance operations, with their major investment positions itemized; (3) our manufacturing, publishing and retailing businesses, leaving aside certain non-operating assets and purchase-price accounting adjustments; and (4) an all-other category that includes the non-operating assets (primarily marketable securities) held by the companies in (3) as well as various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent companies.</p>	<p>下表我们依(1)金融事业, 包含互助储贷与史考特财务公司(2)保险事业, 依投资部位分门别类(3)制造、出版、零售事业, 去除某些非营业资产与购买法会计调整数(4)其它项目, 包含前述非营业资产(主要是有价证券投资)及 Wesco 与伯克希尔母公司所持有的资产与负债</p>
<p>If you combine the earnings and the net worths of these four segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP statements. However, we want to emphasize that our new presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors, who in no way bless it. (In fact, they may be horrified; I don't want to ask.)</p>	<p>如果将以上四类的盈余与净值加总, 你将得到与一般公认会计原则一致的总数, 但是我们必须强调的是这种新的表示方法并未经过会计师看过, 最好是不要, 因为他们要是看到这种报表, 一定会被吓个半死。</p>
<p>I referred earlier to a major change in GAAP that is expected in 1990. This change relates to the calculation of deferred taxes, and is both complicated and controversial - so much so that its imposition, originally scheduled for 1989, was postponed for a year.</p>	<p>先前我曾提到在 1990 年会有另一项会计原则的重大变动, 主要与递延所得税有关, 这原则相当的复杂且极具争议性, 以致于原定计画于 1989 年实施延后一年。</p>
<p>When implemented, the new rule will affect us in various ways. Most important, we will be required to change the way we calculate our liability for deferred taxes on the unrealized appreciation of stocks held by our insurance companies.</p>	<p>当这项原则开始实施后, 对我们有几个方面, 最重要的一点就是我们必须重新修正旗下保险公司所持有的未实现股票资本利得, 其计算递延所得税负债的方式,</p>
<p>Right now, our liability is layered. For the unrealized appreciation that dates back to 1986 and earlier years, \$1.2 billion, we have booked a 28% tax liability. For the unrealized appreciation built up since, \$600 million, the tax liability has been booked at 34%. The difference reflects the increase in tax rates that went into effect in 1987.</p>	<p>原先我们在这方面的负债分作好几层, 对于 1986 年以前帐列未实现利益, 大约在 12 亿美元左右, 系以 28% 的税率估算, 对于 1986 年之后的帐列未实现利益, 大约在 6 亿美元左右, 系以 34% 的税率估算, 1987 年起调整税率的差异反应税负的差异。</p>
<p>It now appears, however, that the new accounting rule will require us to establish the entire liability at 34% in 1990, taking the charge against our earnings. Assuming no change in tax</p>	<p>现在看起来, 新的会计原则要求我们从 1990 年开始必须将所有未实现利益的预估税率订在 34%, 经估算光是这一项做法就会使得我们的年度盈</p>

<p>rates by 1990, this step will reduce our earnings in that year (and thereby our reported net worth) by \$71 million. The proposed rule will also affect other items on our balance sheet, but these changes will have only a minor impact on earnings and net worth.</p>	<p>余与净值减少七千多万美元，还不包含其它大大小小的影响。</p>
<p>We have no strong views about the desirability of this change in calculation of deferred taxes. We should point out, however, that neither a 28% nor a 34% tax liability precisely depicts economic reality at Berkshire since we have no plans to sell the stocks in which we have the great bulk of our gains.</p>	<p>其实我们不认为这样转变有其必要性，因为对于伯克希尔来说不管税率是 28%或是 34%，都不能反应我们公司的实质现况，因为我们从来不考虑出售我们具有庞大未实现利益的股票。</p>
<p>To those of you who are uninterested in accounting, I apologize for this dissertation. I realize that many of you do not pore over our figures, but instead hold Berkshire primarily because you know that: (1) Charlie and I have the bulk of our money in Berkshire; (2) we intend to run things so that your gains or losses are in direct proportion to ours; and (3) the record has so far been satisfactory. There is nothing necessarily wrong with this kind of aith?approach to investing. Other shareholders, however, prefer analysis? approach and we want to supply the information they need. In our own investing, we search for situations in which both approaches give us the same answer.</p>	<p>对于那些对会计不感兴趣的人，很抱歉耽误各位的时间，我很清楚你们当中有很多根本不会仔细去看数字，但却仍持续支持我们，因为你们知道 (1) 查理跟我本身的身家也都在里面 (2) 我们绝对会与各位共享荣枯 (3) 到目前为止先前的记录还算令人满意。事实上这种完全信任的投资方法并没有什么不好，但也有一些股东比较喜欢深入分析的方式，因此我们也有必要提供足够的信息给他们，至于伯克希尔本身在做投资时，则是两种方法并用，重点在于能不能得到满意的答案。</p>
<p>Sources of Reported Earnings</p>	<p>帐列盈余的来源</p>
<p>In addition to supplying you with our new four-sector accounting material, we will continue to list the major sources of Berkshire reported earnings just as we have in the past.</p>	<p>除了提供给各位最新四个部门的会计资料，我们一如往常还是会提列出伯克希尔帐列盈余的主要来源</p>
<p>In the following table, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I e explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than the standard GAAP presentation, which makes</p>	<p>在下表商誉的摊销数与购买法会计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则，不管是对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计师查核的数字一致。</p>

<p>purchase-price adjustments on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.</p>	
<p>Further information about these businesses is given in the Business Segment section on pages 32-34, and in the Management Discussion section on pages 36-40. In these sections you also will find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. For information on Wesco businesses, I urge you to read Charlie Munger letter, which starts on page 52. It contains the best description I have seen of the events that produced the present savings-and-loan crisis. Also, take special note of Dave Hillstrom performance at Precision Steel Warehouse, a Wesco subsidiary. Precision operates in an extremely competitive industry, yet Dave consistently achieves good returns on invested capital. Though data is lacking to prove the point, I think it is likely that his performance, both in 1988 and years past, would rank him number one among his peers.</p>	<p>年报中还有企业个别部门的信息，有关 Wesco 公司的信息，我强烈建议大家看看查理孟格所写的年报，里头包含我看过对储贷机构危机事件写得最贴切的一篇文章，另外也可以顺便看看 Precision 钢铁厂，这家 Wesco 的子公司所处的产业竞争相当激烈，但经理人 Dave 仍然努力创造相当不错的绩效，虽然手上缺乏资料来证明，但我相信他的表现绝对不比其它同侪逊色。</p>
<p>The earnings achieved by our operating businesses are superb, whether measured on an absolute basis or against those of their competitors. For that we thank our operating managers: You and I are fortunate to be associated with them.</p>	<p>我们旗下各项营运事业所创造的盈余，不管是依绝对值或是与同业相较，实在是相当出色，对此我们衷心感谢这些辛苦的经理人，你我应该感到庆幸能与他们一起共事。</p>
<p>At Berkshire, associations like these last a long time. We do not remove superstars from our lineup merely because they have attained a specified age - whether the traditional 65, or the 95 reached by Mrs. B on the eve of Hanukkah in 1988. Superb managers are too scarce a resource to be discarded simply because a cake gets crowded with candles. Moreover, our experience with newly-minted MBAs has not been that great. Their academic records always look terrific and the candidates always know just what to say; but too often they are short on personal commitment to the company and general business savvy. It</p>	<p>在伯克希尔，这样的关系可以维持相当长久，我们不会因为这些杰出优秀的明星经理人年纪到了一定程度就把他们给换掉，不管是 65 岁或是 B 太太在 1988 年所打破的 95 岁上限，明星的经理人实在是可遇不可求的稀罕珍宝，他们就像是插满蜡烛的蛋糕，如何叫人舍得把他们丢弃，相较之下，我们对于新进的 MBA 企管硕士的评价就没有那么高了，他们的学术经历看起来总是很吓人，讲起话来头头是道，但个人对于企业长期发展的投入却相当有限，实在是很难去教菜</p>

difficult to teach a new dog old tricks.	狗那套老伎俩。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin) and her cart roll on and on. She been the boss for 51 years, having started the business at 44 with \$500. (Think what she would have done with \$1,000!) With Mrs. B, old age will always be ten years away.	在内布拉斯加家具店方面，B 太太坐着她的轮椅持续运转，自从 44 岁那年以 500 块美金开始创业当老板，至今已有 51 个年头，(要是当初是用 1,000 块的话，现在可能更不得了)，对于 B 太太来说，就是再多十岁也不嫌老。
The Mart, long the largest home furnishings store in the country, continues to grow. In the fall, the store opened a detached 20,000 square foot Clearance Center, which expands our ability to offer bargains in all price ranges.	这家全美最大的家具量贩店到现在还在持续成长，去年秋天，又新开了一家占地 20,000 平方英尺的清洁用品中心，让我们的产品线不论是各种价格都应有尽有。
Recently Dillard , one of the most successful department store operations in the country, entered the Omaha market. In many of its stores, Dillard runs a full furniture department, undoubtedly doing well in this line. Shortly before opening in Omaha, however, William Dillard, chairman of the company, announced that his new store would not sell furniture. Said he, referring to NFM: e don want to compete with them. We think they are about the best there is.?	最近 Dillard 一家在全美地区经营相当成功的百货公司打算进军奥玛哈地区，在它其它主要的分店都设有家具部门，事实上他们在这方面也做的相当成功，不过就在其奥玛哈分店开幕的前夕，Dillard 总裁 William 先生却宣布这家分店决定不卖家具，他特别提到 NFM，表示你绝对不会想要与它竞争，我想它在当地已经是最强的了。
At the Buffalo News we extol the value of advertising, and our policies at NFM prove that we practice what we preach. Over the past three years NFM has been the largest ROP advertiser in the Omaha World-Herald. (ROP advertising is the kind printed in the paper, as contrasted to the preprinted-insert kind.) In no other major market, to my knowledge, is a home furnishings operation the leading customer of the newspaper. At times, we also run large ads in papers as far away as Des Moines, Sioux City and Kansas City - always with good results. It truly does pay to advertise, as long as you have something worthwhile to offer.	水牛城报纸我们赞扬广告的价值，而我们在 NFM 的政策则是证明我们所宣扬的确实可行，过去三年来，NFM 是奥玛哈世界先锋报的最大广告客户，(ROP 是指直接印在报纸而非夹报式的广告)，据我所知，除此之外没有一家报纸的主要广告客户是家具商，同时我们也在堪萨斯等地区刊登广告，所得到的反应也相当不错，广告当然有其效果，只要你所要介绍的东西值得推荐。
Mrs. B son, Louie, and his boys, Ron and Irv, complete the winning Blumkin team. It a joy to	B 太太的儿子路易，还有他几个小孩组成了一支梦幻队伍，跟他们一起共

<p>work with this family. All its members have character that matches their extraordinary abilities.</p>	<p>事实在是一种享受，所有的成员品格与才能兼具。</p>
<p>o Last year I stated unequivocally that pre-tax margins at The Buffalo News would fall in 1988. That forecast would have proved correct at almost any other newspaper our size or larger. But Stan Lipsey - bless him - has managed to make me look foolish.</p>	<p>去年我曾明确地表示水牛城日报1988年的税前盈余一定会下滑，事实证明要不是有 Stan Lipsey，结果可能会如我所预测，与其它同规模的报纸同样地沉沦，很高兴 Stan 让我看起来很愚蠢。</p>
<p>Though we increased our prices a bit less than the industry average last year, and though our newsprint costs and wage rates rose in line with industry norms, Stan actually improved margins a tad. No one in the newspaper business has a better managerial record. He has achieved it, furthermore, while running a paper that gives readers an extraordinary amount of news. We believe that our newswhole?percentage - the portion of the paper devoted to news - is bigger than that of any other dominant paper of our size or larger. The percentage was 49.5% in 1988 versus 49.8% in 1987. We are committed to keeping it around 50%, whatever the level or trend of profit margins.</p>	<p>虽然我们去年我们调涨的价格较同业水准略低，同时印刷与工资成本调整的幅度与同业一致，但 Stan 还是硬生生让毛利率又扩大一些，在新闻业没有其它人可以像他这样有更好的经营绩效，且同时还能够让读者得到如此丰富的新闻，我们相信我们自己的新闻比率，绝对是同样规模或甚至更大报纸中最高的，1988年49.5%，不管获利状况如此，我们一定会努力将这个比率维持在50%上下。</p>
<p>Charlie and I have loved the newspaper business since we were youngsters, and we have had great fun with the News in the 12 years since we purchased it. We were fortunate to find Murray Light, a top-flight editor, on the scene when we arrived and he has made us proud of the paper ever since.</p>	<p>查理跟我在年轻的时候就热爱新闻事业，而买下水牛城报纸的12年来，让我们渡过许多快乐时光，我们很幸运能够找到像 Murray 这样杰出的总编辑，让我们一入主水牛城报纸后，便深深引以为傲。</p>
<p>o See Candies sold a record 25.1 million pounds in 1988. Prospects did not look good at the end of October, but excellent Christmas volume, considerably better than the record set in 1987, turned the tide.</p>	<p>喜斯糖果在1988年总共销售了2,510万磅重的糖果，本来在十月前整个销售前景看起来不太乐观，但拜圣诞节旺季特别旺所致，整个局势跟着扭转。</p>
<p>As we e told you before, See business continues to become more Christmas-concentrated. In 1988, the Company</p>	<p>就像我们以前告诉各位的，喜斯的糖果旺季越来越向圣诞节集中，去年光是12月的税前获利2,900万就占全</p>

<p>earned a record 90% of its full-year profits in December: \$29 million out of \$32.5 million before tax. (It enough to make you believe in Santa Claus.) December deluge of business produces a modest seasonal bulge in Berkshire corporate earnings. Another small bulge occurs in the first quarter, when most World Book annuals are sold.</p>	<p>年度 3,250 万的 90%，(如此你应该相信圣诞老公公真的存在了吧)，十二月的旺季使得伯克希尔第四季的盈余看起来相当不错，另外第一季则是因为世界百科全书年度出版所以也会有一波小高潮。</p>
<p>Charlie and I put Chuck Huggins in charge of See about five minutes after we bought the company. Upon reviewing his record, you may wonder what took us so long.</p>	<p>查理跟我是在买下喜斯糖果五分钟之后，决定为 Chuck Huggins 负责这家公司的管理，在看过他这些年来的绩效之后，你可能会怀疑为何我们要考虑那么久！</p>
<p>o At Fechheimer, the Heldmans - Bob, George, Gary, Roger and Fred - are the Cincinnati counterparts of the Blumkins. Neither furniture retailing nor uniform manufacturing has inherently attractive economics. In these businesses, only exceptional managements can deliver high returns on invested capital. And that exactly what the five Heldmans do. (As Mets announcer Ralph Kiner once said when comparing pitcher Steve Trout to his father, Dizzy Trout, the famous Detroit Tigers pitcher: here a lot of heredity in that family.?</p>	<p>在费区海默，Heldmans 家族就好像是 B 太太家族的辛辛那提版，不管是家具业或者是制服业都不会很有吸引力的行业，也只有好的管理才能让股东们获得好的投资报酬，这正是 Heldmans 五位家族成员为伯克希尔所作的贡献，身为职棒大都会队的发言人，Ralph Kiner 曾说比较该队投手 Steve Trout 与他的父亲 Dizzy Trout 也是老虎队名投手，你就会发现虎父无犬子。</p>
<p>Fechheimer made a fairly good-sized acquisition in 1988. Charlie and I have such confidence in the business savvy of the Heldman family that we okayed the deal without even looking at it. There are very few managements anywhere - including those running the top tier companies of the <u>Fortune 500</u> - in which we would exhibit similar confidence.</p>	<p>费区海默在 1988 年进行了一项规模颇大的购并案，查理跟我对于他们相当有信心，所以我们连看都没有看就同意了这项交易，很少有经营阶层，即便是财星五百大企业也好，能得到我们这样的信任。</p>
<p>Because of both this acquisition and some internal growth, sales at Fechheimer should be up significantly in 1989.</p>	<p>因为这项购并案与内部本身的成长，费区海默的营业额可望大幅成长。</p>
<p>o All of the operations managed by Ralph Schey - World Book, Kirby, and The Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group - performed splendidly in</p>	<p>所有 Ralph Schey 所管理的事业，包含世界百科全书、寇比吸尘器与史考特费兹制造集团，在 1988 年的表现</p>

<p>1988. Returns on the capital entrusted to Ralph continue to be exceptional.</p>	<p>皆相当出色，投资其上的资金也获得相当不错的报酬。</p>
<p>Within the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, particularly fine progress was recorded at its largest unit, Campbell Hausfeld. This company, the country leading producer of small and medium-sized air compressors, has more than doubled earnings since 1986.</p>	<p>在史考特费兹制造集团当中，又以 Campbell 家用器具最突出，这家全美最大的中小型压缩机自从 1986 年来每年盈余都呈倍数成长。</p>
<p>Unit sales at both Kirby and World Book were up significantly in 1988, with export business particularly strong. World Book became available in the Soviet Union in September, when that country largest American book store opened in Moscow. Ours is the only general encyclopedia offered at the store.</p>	<p>寇比吸尘器与世界百科全书的 1988 年销售数量都大幅成长，尤其在外销部份更是强劲，世界百科全书在九月配合莫斯科当地最大的一家美国百货公司开幕，正式在苏联推出，成为该店唯一展示的一套百科全书。</p>
<p>Ralph personal productivity is amazing: In addition to running 19 businesses in superb fashion, he is active at The Cleveland Clinic, Ohio University, Case Western Reserve, and a venture capital operation that has spawned sixteen Ohio-based companies and resurrected many others. Both Ohio and Berkshire are fortunate to have Ralph on their side.</p>	<p>Ralph 个人的工作效率真是惊人，除了同时经营 19 项事业之外，他还投入相当的时间在克里夫兰医院、Ohio 大学等单位，另外还负责一个创投，创设了 16 家位于 Ohio 的新公司，他可以称的上是 Ohio 与伯克希尔之宝。</p>
<p>Borsheim</p>	<p>波仙珠宝</p>
<p>It was in 1983 that Berkshire purchased an 80% interest in The Nebraska Furniture Mart. Your Chairman blundered then by neglecting to ask Mrs. B a question any schoolboy would have thought of: re there any more at home like you??Last month I corrected the error: We are now 80% partners with another branch of the family.</p>	<p>伯克希尔是在 1983 年买下内布拉斯加家具店 80%的股权，当时我忘了问 B 太太一个连小学生都会想到的问题，你还有没有其它兄弟姐妹，上个月我补救了这个错误，现在我们又成为另一个家族分支 80%的股东。</p>
<p>After Mrs. B came over from Russia in 1917, her parents and five siblings followed. (Her two other siblings had preceded her.) Among the sisters was Rebecca Friedman who, with her husband, Louis, escaped in 1922 to the west through Latvia in a journey as perilous as Mrs. B earlier odyssey to the east through</p>	<p>当 B 太太 1917 年从苏俄往东经满州一路逃到美国之后，她的双亲与五位兄弟姐妹也陆续来到美国，其中她有一个姊妹 Rebecca 在 1922 年跟着丈夫 Friedman 冒着生命危险往西途经拉脱维亚，当家族在奥玛哈重新团聚时大家一无所有且身无分文，然而只</p>

<p>Manchuria. When the family members reunited in Omaha they had no tangible assets. However, they came equipped with an extraordinary combination of brains, integrity, and enthusiasm for work – and that all they needed. They have since proved themselves invincible.</p>	<p>要身具智能、品格与热情一切就已足够，后来证明他们所向无敌。</p>
<p>In 1948 Mr. Friedman purchased Borsheim , a small Omaha jewelry store. He was joined in the business by his son, Ike, in 1950 and, as the years went by, Ike son, Alan, and his sons-in-law, Marvin Cohn and Donald Yale, came in also.</p>	<p>1948年Friedman先生买下奥玛哈地区一家叫波仙的小珠宝店，后来他的儿子与女婿陆续加入。</p>
<p>You won be surprised to learn that this family brings to the jewelry business precisely the same approach that the Blumkins bring to the furniture business. The cornerstone for both enterprises is Mrs. B creed: ell cheap and tell the truth. ?Other fundamentals at both businesses are: (1) single store operations featuring huge inventories that provide customers with an enormous selection across all price ranges, (2) daily attention to detail by top management, (3) rapid turnover, (4) shrewd buying, and (5) incredibly low expenses. The combination of the last three factors lets both stores offer everyday prices that no one in the country comes close to matching.</p>	<p>你应该不难预料，这个家族为当地珠宝业所带来的影响与B太太的情况相近，两家店共同的特色就是东西实在又价美物廉，另外共通的特色还有(1)单店经营，但货品样式价格种类齐全，满足消费者各式需求(2)老板每天专心经营(3)货品周转快速(4)精明的采购(5)费用开销难以想象地低。后面三项特点让店内产品的售价，全美其它地方都得比。</p>
<p>Most people, no matter how sophisticated they are in other matters, feel like babes in the woods when purchasing jewelry. They can judge neither quality nor price. For them only one rule makes sense: If you don know jewelry, know the jeweler.</p>	<p>大部分的人们不管在其它行业多么学有专精，但是遇到买珠宝首饰时，就像是迷失在森林里的小孩子一样，不会判断东西的品质好坏与价格高低，对这些人来说，只要记住一条，不懂珠宝没有关系，只要认识珠宝商就好。</p>
<p>I can assure you that those who put their trust in Ike Friedman and his family will never be disappointed. The way in which we purchased our interest in their business is the ultimate testimonial. Borsheim had no audited financial statements; nevertheless, we didn</p>	<p>我敢保证大家只要放心交给Friedman家族，一定不会让各位失望，我们购买波仙股权的方式就是最好的证明，波仙没有会计师查核报告，也没有盘点存货、验证应收帐款或是做任何方式的查核，他们只是简</p>

<p>take inventory, verify receivables or audit the operation in any way. Ike simply told us what was so -- and on that basis we drew up a one-page contract and wrote a large check.</p>	<p>单地告诉我们如何如何，于是双方就草拟的一页简单的合约，并由我们开出一大笔金额的支票。</p>
<p>Business at Borsheim has mushroomed in recent years as the reputation of the Friedman family has spread. Customers now come to the store from all over the country. Among them have been some friends of mine from both coasts who thanked me later for getting them there.</p>	<p>随着 Friedman 家族声誉的远播，近年来波仙珠宝的生意越做越大，客户从美国各地远道而来，其中也包含我一些从东西两岸来的朋友，他们也都感谢我能带他们去参观波仙。</p>
<p>Borsheim new links to Berkshire will change nothing in the way this business is run. All members of the Friedman family will continue to operate just as they have before; Charlie and I will stay on the sidelines where we belong. And when we say all members, the words have real meaning. Mr. and Mrs. Friedman, at 88 and 87, respectively, are in the store daily. The wives of Ike, Alan, Marvin and Donald all pitch in at busy times, and a fourth generation is beginning to learn the ropes.</p>	<p>波仙的营运模式并不会因为伯克希尔的加入而有所改变，所有的家族成员仍将持续在各自的岗位上奋斗，查理跟我会站在旁边默默支持，事实上所有的成员包含高龄 88 岁与 87 岁的老先生与老太太，仍然每天到店里工作，其它儿子媳妇也是从早忙到晚，家族的第四代已正准备开始学习接班。</p>
<p>It is great fun to be in business with people you have long admired. The Friedmans, like the Blumkins, have achieved success because they have deserved success. Both families focus on what right for the customer and that, inevitably, works out well for them, also. We couldn't have better partners.</p>	<p>跟你所欣赏的人一起共事实在是一件很大的乐趣，Friedmans 家族的成功就像是 B 太太家族的成功一样，实至名归，两个家族都坚持对客户有益的事之上，同时对他们自己也有很大的益处，这是我们最好的事业伙伴。</p>
<p>Insurance Operations</p>	<p>保险事业营运</p>
<p>The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding on to policyholders' funds (the float) is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107-111 range typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by</p>	<p>综合比率代表的是保险的总成本(损失加上费用)占保费收入的比率，100 以下代表会有承销利益，100 以上代表会有承销损失，若把持有保费收入浮存金(扣除股东权益部份所产生的盈余)所产生的投资收益列入考量，损益两平的范围大概是在 107-111 之间。</p>

shareholders.	
<p>For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the industry incurred losses to grow by about 10% annually, even in years when general inflation runs considerably lower. If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10% rate, underwriting losses will mount, though the industry tendency to underreserve when business turns bad may obscure their size for a time. As the table shows, the industry underwriting loss grew in 1988. This trend is almost certain to continue - and probably will accelerate - for at least two more years.</p>	<p>基于前几次年报所说明的理由，即使是通货膨胀在这几年来相对温和，我们预期保险业每年损失增加的比率约在 10%左右，若是保费收入成长没有到达 10%以上，损失一定会增加，虽然保险公司在景气不好时，会习惯性地损失暂时隐藏起来，如附表所示，1988 年产业整体的损失确实增加，而这个趋势应该会继续持续下去，甚至在未来两年还会加速恶化。</p>
<p>The property-casualty insurance industry is not only subnormally profitable, it is subnormally popular. (As Sam Goldwyn philosophized: in life, one must learn to take the bitter with the sour. ? One of the ironies of business is that many relatively-unprofitable industries that are plagued by inadequate prices habitually find themselves beat upon by irate customers even while other, hugely profitable industries are spared complaints, no matter how high their prices.</p>	<p>产险业的获利情况不但是相当的低，而且也是不太受尊重的行业，（就像是山姆高德温曾说一个人要学会体验人生的苦与乐，不过这行很讽刺的是，做的要死要活的同时，还要被客户糟蹋，不像有些赚翻了的行业，东西明明贵的要死，却是一个愿打，一个愿挨）</p>
<p>Take the breakfast cereal industry, whose return on invested capital is more than double that of the auto insurance industry (which is why companies like Kellogg and General Mills sell at five times book value and most large insurers sell close to book). The cereal companies regularly impose price increases, few of them related to a significant jump in their costs. Yet not a peep is heard from consumers. But when auto insurers raise prices by amounts that do not even match cost increases, customers are outraged. If you want to be loved, it clearly better to sell high-priced corn flakes than low-priced auto insurance.</p>	<p>以早餐麦片为例，它的资产报酬率是汽车保险业的一倍（这也是为什么家乐氏与通用磨坊的股价净值比是五倍，而保险业者的股价净值比仅为一倍），麦片公司常常在调整产品售价，即便其生产成本没什么变，但消费者却连一个屁都不吭一声，但要是换做是保险业者，就算只是反映成本稍微调整一下价格，保户马上就会生气地跳起来，所以若你识相，最好是选择去卖高价的玉米片，而不是低价的汽车保险。</p>
<p>The antagonism that the public feels toward the industry can have serious consequences:</p>	<p>一般大众对于保险业的敌视会造成严重的后果，去年秋天加州通过的一</p>

<p>Proposition 103, a California initiative passed last fall, threatens to push auto insurance prices down sharply, even though costs have been soaring. The price cut has been suspended while the courts review the initiative, but the resentment that brought on the vote has not been suspended: Even if the initiative is overturned, insurers are likely to find it tough to operate profitably in California. (Thank heavens the citizenry isn't mad at bonbons: If Proposition 103 applied to candy as well as insurance, See would be forced to sell its product for \$5.76 per pound. rather than the \$7.60 we charge - and would be losing money by the bucketful.)</p>	<p>项 103 提案，虽然成本一再上涨，却还威胁要将汽车保费价格大幅压低，所幸法院后来检视这项提案予以搁置，但这次投票所带来的冲击未曾稍减，保险业者在加州已很难再有营运获利的空间，（感谢老天还好加州人没有对巧克力糖果感到反感，若是 103 提案也如保险般适用于糖果的话，喜斯可能被迫以每磅 5.76 元而不是现在的每磅 7.6 元，果真如此，喜斯可能就要亏大钱了）</p>
<p>The immediate direct effects on Berkshire from the initiative are minor, since we saw few opportunities for profit in the rate structure that existed in California prior to the vote. However, the forcing down of prices would seriously affect GEICO, our 44%-owned investee, which gets about 10% of its premium volume from California. Even more threatening to GEICO is the possibility that similar pricing actions will be taken in other states, through either initiatives or legislation.</p>	<p>对伯克希尔来说，这项法案的短期影响不大，因为即使在这法案之前，加州现行的费率结构也很难让我找到有获利的商机，然而这项压低保费的做法却会直接影响到我们持有 44% 股权的 GEICO，约有 10% 的保费收入来自加州，更具威胁的是若其它州，不管是透过提案或是立法的方式，也跟进采取类似的行动，</p>
<p>If voters insist that auto insurance be priced below cost, it eventually must be sold by government. Stockholders can subsidize policyholders for a short period, but only taxpayers can subsidize them over the long term. At most property-casualty companies, socialized auto insurance would be no disaster for shareholders. Because of the commodity characteristics of the industry, most insurers earn mediocre returns and therefore have little or no economic goodwill to lose if they are forced by government to leave the auto insurance business. But GEICO, because it is a low-cost producer able to earn high returns on equity, has a huge amount of economic goodwill at risk. In turn, so do we.</p>	<p>若民众坚持汽车保险费的价格一定要低于成本，则最后可能要由政府直接来负责，股东或可暂时支应保户，但只有纳税人可以长久地给予支助，对大部分的产物意外险业者来说，社会化的汽车保险对于其股东不会有太大影响，因为由于这个产业是属于大众产品，保险业者所赚的投资报酬平平，所以若因此被政府强迫退出市场，也不会有太大的商誉损失，但 GEICO 就不一样了，由于它的成本低，相对地可以获得高报酬，所以可能会有很大的潜在商誉损失，而这当然会连带影响到我们。</p>

<p>At Berkshire, in 1988, our premium volume continued to fall, and in 1989 we will experience a large decrease for a special reason: The contract through which we receive 7% of the business of Fireman Fund expires on August 31. At that time, we will return to Fireman Fund the unearned premiums we hold that relate to the contract. This transfer of funds will show up in our premiums written account as a negative \$85 million or so and will make our third-quarter figures look rather peculiar. However, the termination of this contract will not have a significant effect on profits.</p>	<p>在 1988 年伯克希尔的保费收入持续减少，到了 1989 年我们预期保费收入还会大幅下滑，一方面是因为消防人员退休基金即将于八月底到期，届时依合约我们必须将未到期的保费退还，估计总共退回的金额 8,500 万美元，这将使得我们第三季的数字看起来有点奇怪，当然这对于我们公司本身的获利不会造成太大的影响。</p>
<p>Berkshire underwriting results continued to be excellent in 1988. Our combined ratio (on a statutory basis and excluding structured settlements and financial reinsurance) was 104. Reserve development was favorable for the second year in a row, after a string of years in which it was very unsatisfactory. Details on both underwriting and reserve development appear on pages 36-38.</p>	<p>伯克希尔 1988 年的承保表现依旧相当不错，我们的综合比率(依照法定基础扣除和解与财务再保)大约在 104，损失准备提列在前几年不佳后，连续两年情况还算良好)</p>
<p>Our insurance volume over the next few years is likely to run very low, since business with a reasonable potential for profit will almost certainly be scarce. So be it. At Berkshire, we simply will not write policies at rates that carry the expectation of economic loss. We encounter enough troubles when we expect a gain.</p>	<p>我们的保费收入规模预计在未来几年内都会维持在相当低的水平，因为有利可图的生意实在是少之又少，随它去，在伯克希尔我们不可能在知道明明会亏钱的情况下，还去硬接生意，光是接看起来有赚头的生意，就让我们麻烦够多了。</p>
<p>Despite - or perhaps because of - low volume, our profit picture during the next few years is apt to be considerably brighter than the industry . We are sure to have an exceptional amount of float compared to premium volume, and that augurs well for profits. In 1989 and 1990 we expect our float/premiums ratio to be at least three times that of the typical property/casualty company. Mike Goldberg, with special help from Ajit Jain, Dinos Iordanou, and the National Indemnity managerial team, has positioned us well in that</p>	<p>尽管(也或许正因为如此)我们的保单量少，可以预期的我们的获利情况在未来几年内也会比同业来的出色，相较于保单量我们有高比例的浮存金，通常这代表着获利，在 1989 与 1990 这两年内，我们的浮存金/保费收入比例至少会是同业水准的三倍以上，Mike Goldberg 在 Ajit Jain 等人的协助下，加上国家产险的经营团队使我们站在相当有利的位置。</p>

<p>respect.</p>	
<p>At some point - we don't know when - we will be deluged with insurance business. The cause will probably be some major physical or financial catastrophe. But we could also experience an explosion in business, as we did in 1985, because large and increasing underwriting losses at other companies coincide with their recognition that they are far underreserved. In the meantime, we will retain our talented professionals, protect our capital, and try not to make major mistakes.</p>	<p>有一点我们不知道什么时候，我们会被保险事业拖垮，有可能会是一些重大的天然或是经济上的意外，但我们也有可能会遇到像 1985 年一样爆炸性的成长，因为当其它同业因长期杀价抢单，一夕之间损失突然爆发，才发现损失提列准备远远不足，在那种情况下，我们一定会稳固好我们的专业人员与资本并尽量避免犯下重大的错误。</p>
<p>Marketable Securities</p>	<p>有价证券投资</p>
<p>In selecting marketable securities for our insurance companies, we can choose among five major categories: (1) long-term common stock investments, (2) medium-term fixed-income securities, (3) long-term fixed-income securities, (4) short-term cash equivalents, and (5) short-term arbitrage commitments.</p>	<p>在为我们的保险事业选择有价证券投资之时，我们主要有五种选择(1) 长期股票投资(2) 长期固定收益债券(3) 中期固定收益债券(4) 短期约当现金(5) 短期套利交易</p>
<p>We have no particular bias when it comes to choosing from these categories. We just continuously search among them for the highest after-tax returns as measured by mathematical expectation, limiting ourselves always to investment alternatives we think we understand. Our criteria have nothing to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings; our goal, rather, is to maximize eventual net worth.</p>	<p>对于这五种类型的交易，我们没有特别的偏好，我们只是持续不断地寻找最高的税后报酬预计的数学期望值，且仅限于我们认为了解熟悉的投资，我们无意让与短期的帐面盈余好看，我们的目标是让长期的净值极大化。</p>
<p>Also unchanged is our unqualified admiration of their managements: Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Cap Cities, Bill Snyder and Lou Simpson at GEICO, and Kay Graham and Dick Simmons at The Washington Post. Charlie and I appreciate enormously the talent and integrity these managers bring to their businesses.</p>	<p>我们永久的持股-资本城/ABC、GEICO 汽车保险与华盛顿邮报依旧不变，同样不变的是我们对于这些管理阶层无条件的敬仰，不管是资本城/ABC 的 Tom Murphy 与 Dan Burke、GEICO 汽车保险的 Bill Snyder 与 Lou Simpson，还有华盛顿邮报的 Kay Graham 与 Dick Simmons，查理跟我对他们所展现的才能与品格同感敬佩。</p>

<p>Their performance, which we have observed at close range, contrasts vividly with that of many CEOs, which we have fortunately observed from a safe distance. Sometimes these CEOs clearly do not belong in their jobs; their positions, nevertheless, are usually secure. The supreme irony of business management is that it is far easier for an inadequate CEO to keep his job than it is for an inadequate subordinate.</p>	<p>他们的表现，就我们最近距离的观察，与许多公司的 CEO 截然不同，所幸我们能与后者保持适当的距离，因为有时这些 CEO 实在是不适任，但却总是能够坐稳其宝座，企业管理最讽刺的就是不适任的老板要比不适任的部属更容易保住其位置。</p>
<p>If a secretary, say, is hired for a job that requires typing ability of at least 80 words a minute and turns out to be capable of only 50 words a minute, she will lose her job in no time. There is a logical standard for this job; performance is easily measured; and if you can make the grade, you e out. Similarly, if new sales people fail to generate sufficient business quickly enough, they will be let go. Excuses will not be accepted as a substitute for orders.</p>	<p>假设一位秘书在应征时被要求一分钟要能够打 80 个字，但录取之后被发现一分钟只能打 50 个字，很快地她就可能被炒鱿鱼，因为有一个相当客观的标准在那里，其表现如何很容易可以衡量的出来；同样的，一个新进的业务，若是不能马上创造足够业绩，可能立刻就要走路，为了维持纪律，很难允许有例外情形发生。</p>
<p>However, a CEO who doesn't perform is frequently carried indefinitely. One reason is that performance standards for his job seldom exist. When they do, they are often fuzzy or they may be waived or explained away, even when the performance shortfalls are major and repeated. At too many companies, the boss shoots the arrow of managerial performance and then hastily paints the bullseye around the spot where it lands.</p>	<p>但是一个 CEO 表现不好，却可以无限期的撑下去，一个原因就是根本没有一套可以衡量其表现的标准存在，就算真的有，也是写的很模糊，或是含混解释过去，即便是错误与过失一再发生也是如此，有太多的公司是等老板射箭出去后，再到墙上把准心描上去。</p>
<p>Another important, but seldom recognized, distinction between the boss and the foot soldier is that the CEO has no immediate superior whose performance is itself getting measured. The sales manager who retains a bunch of lemons in his sales force will soon be in hot water himself. It is in his immediate self-interest to promptly weed out his hiring mistakes. Otherwise, he himself may be weeded out. An office manager who has hired inept secretaries faces the same</p>	<p>另外一个很重要但却很少被提起老板与员工之间的差别是老板本身没有一个直接可以衡量判断其表现的上司，业务经理不可能让一颗老鼠屎一直留在他那一锅粥之内，他一定会很快地把它给挑出来，否则可能连他自己都会有问题，同样的一个老板要是请到一位无能的秘书，也会有相同的动作。</p>

imperative.	
<p>But the CEO boss is a Board of Directors that seldom measures itself and is infrequently held to account for substandard corporate performance. If the Board makes a mistake in hiring, and perpetuates that mistake, so what? Even if the company is taken over because of the mistake, the deal will probably bestow substantial benefits on the outgoing Board members. (The bigger they are, the softer they fall.)</p>	<p>但 CEO 的上司也就是董事会却很少检视其绩效，并为企业表现不佳负责，就算董事会选错了人，而且这个错误还持续存在又怎样？即使因为这样使得公司被接收，通常交易也会确保被逐出的董事会成员有丰厚的利益（且通常公司越大，甜头越多）</p>
<p>Finally, relations between the Board and the CEO are expected to be congenial. At board meetings, criticism of the CEO performance is often viewed as the social equivalent of belching. No such inhibitions restrain the office manager from critically evaluating the substandard typist.</p>	<p>最后董事会与 CEO 之间的关系应该是要能够意气相投，在董事会议当中，对于 CEO 表现的批评就好像是在社交场合中打嗝一样不自然，但却没有一位经理人会被禁止不准严格地审核打字员的绩效。</p>
<p>These points should not be interpreted as a blanket condemnation of CEOs or Boards of Directors: Most are able and hard-working, and a number are truly outstanding. But the management failings that Charlie and I have seen make us thankful that we are linked with the managers of our three permanent holdings. They love their businesses, they think like owners, and they exude integrity and ability.</p>	<p>以上几点不是要一杆子打翻一条船，大部分的 CEO 或是董事会都相当努力、能干，有一小部份更是特别的杰出，但查理跟我在看过很多失败的例子之后，更加对于我们能够与前面三家公司优秀的经理人共事感到非常幸运，他们热爱他们的事业，想法跟老板一致，且散发出才气与品格。</p>
<p>o In 1988 we made major purchases of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Pfd. (Freddie Mac? and Coca Cola. We expect to hold these securities for a long time. In fact, when we own portions of outstanding businesses with outstanding managements, our favorite holding period is forever. We are just the opposite of those who hurry to sell and book profits when companies perform well but who tenaciously hang on to businesses that disappoint. Peter Lynch aptly likens such behavior to cutting the flowers and watering the weeds. Our holdings of Freddie Mac are the maximum allowed by law, and are</p>	<p>1988 年我们做出两项重大的决定，大笔买进联邦家庭贷款抵押公司 (Freddie Mac) 与可口可乐，我们打算要持有这些股票很长的一段期间，事实上当我们发现我们持有兼具杰出企业与杰出经理人的股权时，我们最长的投资期间是永久，我们跟那些急着想要卖出表现不错的股票以实现获利却顽固地不肯出脱那些绩效差的股份的那群人完全相反。彼得林区生动地将这种行为解释成砍除花朵来当作野草的肥料，我们持有 Freddie Mac 的股份比例是法令规定</p>

<p>extensively described by Charlie in his letter. In our consolidated balance sheet these shares are carried at cost rather than market, since they are owned by Mutual Savings and Loan, a non-insurance subsidiary.</p>	<p>的上限，这部份查理在后面会详加为各位说明，因为他们是属于共同储贷-我们一家非保险的子公司所投资，所以在我们的合并资产负债表当中，这些持股将以成本而非市价列示。</p>
<p>We continue to concentrate our investments in a very few companies that we try to understand well. There are only a handful of businesses about which we have strong long-term convictions. Therefore, when we find such a business, we want to participate in a meaningful way. We agree with Mae West: too much of a good thing can be wonderful.?</p>	<p>我们持续将投资集中在少数我们能够了解的公司之上，只有少部份是我们想要长期投入的，因为当我们好不容易找到这样的公司时，我们会想要达到一定的参与程度，我们同意 Mae West 的看法，好东西当然是多多益善。</p>
<p>o We reduced our holdings of medium-term tax-exempt bonds by about \$100 million last year. All of the bonds sold were acquired after August 7, 1986. When such bonds are held by property-casualty insurance companies, 15% of the tax-exempt interest earned is subject to tax.</p>	<p>去年我们减少在中期免税债券约一亿美元的投资，所有卖出的债券都是在 1986 年之后才取得的，当这些债券由产险公司所持有的时候，其中 15% 的利息收入是要课税的。</p>
<p>The \$800 million position we still hold consists almost entirely of bonds grandfathered under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which means they are entirely tax-exempt. Our sales produced a small profit and our remaining bonds, which have an average maturity of about six years, are worth modestly more than carrying value.</p>	<p>剩下我们仍持有约 8 亿美元的债券，都是属于适用 1986 年租税改革法案完全免税的祖父级债券，出售的债券将有些许的获利，而继续持有的债券平均到期日大概是六年，其市价大概略高于帐面价值。</p>
<p>Last year we described our holdings of short-term and intermediate-term bonds of Texaco, which was then in bankruptcy. During 1988, we sold practically all of these bonds at a pre-tax profit of about \$22 million. This sale explains close to \$100 million of the reduction in fixed-income securities on our balance sheet.</p>	<p>去年我们曾提及我们所持有的已破产的 Texaco 短期与中期公司债券，1988 年我们已经将所有的部位处分，获利约 2,200 万美元，此举将使得我们在固定收益债券的投资部位减少 1 亿美元。</p>
<p>We also told you last year about our holdings of another security whose predominant characteristics are those of an intermediate fixed-income issue: our \$700 million position in Salomon Inc 9% convertible preferred. This</p>	<p>去年我们还提到了另外一个深具固定收益特色的投资：亦即所罗门公司 9% 可转换特别股，这种特别股特别要求公司提拨偿债基金，自 1995 年到 1999 年间分批赎回，伯克希尔将这些</p>

<p>preferred has a sinking fund that will retire it in equal annual installments from 1995 to 1999. Berkshire carries this holding at cost. For reasons discussed by Charlie on page 69, the estimated market value of our holding has improved from moderately under cost at the end of last year to moderately over cost at 1988 year end.</p>	<p>投资以成本列示在帐上，基于查理所提的原因，现在的估计市价以从前一年度略低于成本，转变为 1988 年的略高于成本。</p>
<p>The close association we have had with John Gutfreund, CEO of Salomon, during the past year has reinforced our admiration for him. But we continue to have no great insights about the near, intermediate or long-term economics of the investment banking business: This is not an industry in which it is easy to forecast future levels of profitability. We continue to believe that our conversion privilege could well have important value over the life of our preferred. However, the overwhelming portion of the preferred value resides in its fixed-income characteristics, not its equity characteristics.</p>	<p>我们与所罗门 CEO- John Gutfreund 之间良好的关系，随着几年来的合作日益增进，但我们还是无法判断投资银行业的前景，不管是短期、中期或是长期皆然，这是一个难以预估未来获利程度的产业，我们仍然相信我们所拥有的转换权利会在其有效期内，对我们产生相当大的贡献，而这种特别股的价值主要还是来自于其固定收益，而不是股权特性之上。</p>
<p>o We have not lost our aversion to long-term bonds. We will become enthused about such securities only when we become enthused about prospects for long-term stability in the purchasing power of money. And that kind of stability isn't in the cards: Both society and elected officials simply have too many higher-ranking priorities that conflict with purchasing-power stability. The only long-term bonds we hold are those of Washington Public Power Supply Systems (WPPSS). A few of our WPPSS bonds have short maturities and many others, because of their high coupons, are likely to be refunded and paid off in a few years. Overall, our WPPSS holdings are carried on our balance sheet at \$247 million and have a market value of about \$352 million.</p>	<p>我们对于长期债券的规避依旧不变，唯有当我们对于货币的长期购买力有信心时，我们才会对这类的债券有兴趣，但这种稳定却根本没办法预期，因为不管是社会或是选出来的官员实在是太多的优先事项是与购买力的稳定性相冲突的。所以目前我们唯一持有的长期债券就是 WPPSS 华盛顿公用电力供应系统，其中有些属于短期，有一些则是分几年赎回的高票息，目前资产负债表上帐列成本为 2.47 亿美元，目前市价约为 3.52 亿美元。</p>
<p>We explained the reasons for our WPPSS purchases in the 1983 annual report, and are pleased to tell</p>	<p>我们在 1983 年年报中曾经解释过购买 WPPSS 的理由，现在很高兴跟大家</p>

<p>you that this commitment has worked out about as expected. At the time of purchase, most of our bonds were yielding around 17% after taxes and carried no ratings, which had been suspended. Recently, the bonds were rated AA- by Standard & Poor . They now sell at levels only slightly below those enjoyed by top-grade credits.</p>	<p>报告结果完全符合我们当初的预期，在买进的时候，债券的评等被暂时取消，估计税后的投资报酬率约为 17%，最近它被史坦普评等机构评为 AA-等级，目前的市价大概只有比最高等级债信的投资报酬好一点。</p>
<p>In the 1983 report, we compared the economics of our WPPSS purchase to those involved in buying a business. As it turned out, this purchase actually worked out better than did the general run of business acquisitions made in 1983, assuming both are measured on the basis of unleveraged, after tax returns achieved through 1988.</p>	<p>在 1983 年的年报中，我们比较了投资 WPPSS 与一般企业的差异，结果显示这次的投资要比当时同期间所从事购并案还要好，假设两者皆以为无财务杠杆的基础下进行。</p>
<p>Our WPPSS experience, though pleasant, does nothing to alter our negative opinion about long-term bonds. It only makes us hope that we run into some other large stigmatized issue, whose troubles have caused it to be significantly misappraised by the market.</p>	<p>不过我们在 WPPSS 的愉快经验并未能改变我们对于长期债券的负面看法，除非再让我们碰到暂时僵住的大案子，因为短暂的问题使得其市价严重的被低估。</p>
<p>Arbitrage</p>	<p>套利</p>
<p>In past reports we have told you that our insurance subsidiaries sometimes engage in arbitrage as an alternative to holding short-term cash equivalents. We prefer, of course, to make major long-term commitments, but we often have more cash than good ideas. At such times, arbitrage sometimes promises much greater returns than Treasury Bills and, equally important, cools any temptation we may have to relax our standards for long-term investments. (Charlie sign off after we e talked about an arbitrage commitment is usually: kay, at least it will keep you out of bars.?)</p>	<p>在过去的报告中我曾经告诉各位保险子公司有时也会从事套利的操作，以作为短期资金的替代，当然我们比较喜欢长期的投入，但可惜资金总是多过于点子，与此同时，套利的报酬有时会多过于政府公债，同时很重要的一点是可以稍微缓和我们对于寻找长期资金去处的压力，（每次在我们谈完套利投资之后，查理总是会附带一句，这样也好，至少能让你暂时远离市场）</p>
<p>During 1988 we made unusually large profits from arbitrage, measured both by absolute dollars and rate of return. Our pre-tax gain was about \$78 million on average invested funds of about \$147</p>	<p>在 1988 年我们在套利部份斩获不少，不论是金额或是投资报酬率，总计投入 1.47 亿美元的资金，赚取 7,800 万美元的获利。</p>

million.	
<p>This level of activity makes some detailed discussion of arbitrage and our approach to it appropriate. Once, the word applied only to the simultaneous purchase and sale of securities or foreign exchange in two different markets. The goal was to exploit tiny price differentials that might exist between, say, Royal Dutch stock trading in guilders in Amsterdam, pounds in London, and dollars in New York. Some people might call this scalping; it won't surprise you that practitioners opted for the French term, arbitrage.</p>	<p>如此的成绩使我们值得详细的描述一下，所谓的套利是指在不同的市场同时买卖相同的有价证券或是外汇，目的是为了撷取两者之间微小的差距，例如阿姆斯特丹的荷兰币、英国的英镑或是纽约的美元，有些人将此行为称之为剃头皮，但通常这一行的人惯用法国的字汇-套利。</p>
<p>Since World War I the definition of arbitrage – or risk arbitrage, as it is now sometimes called – has expanded to include the pursuit of profits from an announced corporate event such as sale of the company, merger, recapitalization, reorganization, liquidation, self-tender, etc. In most cases the arbitrageur expects to profit regardless of the behavior of the stock market. The major risk he usually faces instead is that the announced event won't happen.</p>	<p>自从第一次世界大战之后，套利或者说风险套利的定义，已延伸包括从已公开的企业购并、重整再造、清算等企业活动中获利，大部分的情况下，套利者期望不管股市变动如何皆能获利，相对的他面临的主要风险是宣布的事件未如预期般发生。</p>
<p>Some offbeat opportunities occasionally arise in the arbitrage field. I participated in one of these when I was 24 and working in New York for Graham-Newman Corp. Rockwood & Co., a Brooklyn based chocolate products company of limited profitability, had adopted LIFO inventory valuation in 1941 when cocoa was selling for 50 cents per pound. In 1954 a temporary shortage of cocoa caused the price to soar to over 60 cents. Consequently Rockwood wished to unload its valuable inventory – quickly, before the price dropped. But if the cocoa had simply been sold off, the company would have owed close to a 50% tax on the proceeds.</p>	<p>有些特别的套利机会也会偶尔出现，我记得在 24 岁时当时我在纽约的葛拉罕-纽曼公司上班，Rockwood 一家在布鲁克林生产巧克力的公司，原则该公司自 1941 年开始就采用后进先出制的存货评价方式，那时可可亚每磅是 50 美分，到了 1954 年可可亚因为暂时缺货价格大涨至 64 美分，因此 Rockwood 想要把帐上价值不菲的可可亚存货在价格滑落之前变卖掉，但若是直接将这批货卖掉，所得的收益可能要支付 50%左右的税金，但 1954 的税务法令及时公布，其中有一项不太为人知的规定，就是如果企业不是把这些存货卖掉而是直接分配给股东间接减少营运规模的话，就可以免税，因此 Rockwood 决定停止其</p>

	<p>贩卖可可亚奶油的业务，并将 1,300 万磅的可可亚豆子发还给股东，同时公司也愿意以可可亚豆子换买回部份股份，换算下来，每股可以换得 80 磅的豆子。</p>
<p>The 1954 Tax Code came to the rescue. It contained an arcane provision that eliminated the tax otherwise due on LIFO profits if inventory was distributed to shareholders as part of a plan reducing the scope of a corporation business. Rockwood decided to terminate one of its businesses, the sale of cocoa butter, and said 13 million pounds of its cocoa bean inventory was attributable to that activity. Accordingly, the company offered to repurchase its stock in exchange for the cocoa beans it no longer needed, paying 80 pounds of beans for each share. For several weeks I busily bought shares, sold beans, and made periodic stops at Schroeder Trust to exchange stock certificates for warehouse receipts. The profits were good and my only expense was subway tokens.</p>	<p>有好几个礼拜我整天忙着买进股票、换豆子，再把豆子拿去卖，并常常跑到 Schroeder 信托公司拿着股票凭证换取仓库保管单，获利算下来还不错，而唯一的成本费用就是地铁车票。</p>
<p>The architect of Rockwood restructuring was an unknown, but brilliant Chicagoan, Jay Pritzker, then 32. If you are familiar with Jay's subsequent record, you won't be surprised to hear the action worked out rather well for Rockwood continuing shareholders also. From shortly before the tender until shortly after it, Rockwood stock appreciated from 15 to 100, even though the company was experiencing large operating losses. Sometimes there is more to stock valuation than price-earnings ratios.</p>	<p>Rockwood 改造计画的规划者是 32 岁没有名气但相当优秀的芝加哥人 Jay Pritzker, 若你知道 Jay 后来的记录, 你应该就不会讶异这个动作对于公司股东有多大的益处了, 在这项提议推出不久之后, 虽然公司营运呈现亏损, 但 Rockwood 的股价却从 15 美元涨到 100 美元, 有时股票的价格会远远超过合理的本益比之外。</p>
<p>In recent years, most arbitrage operations have involved takeovers, friendly and unfriendly. With acquisition fever rampant, with anti-trust challenges almost non-existent, and with bids often ratcheting upward, arbitrageurs have prospered mightily. They have not needed special talents to do well; the trick, a la Peter Sellers in the movie, has simply been being There. ?In</p>	<p>近几年来, 大部分的套利操作都牵涉到购并案, 不管是友善的或是敌意的皆然, 在购并案狂热之时, 几乎感觉不到托拉斯法的存在, 投标的竞价屡创天价, 在当时套利客大行其道, 在这行不需要太多的才能, 唯一的技巧就像是 Peter Sellers 的电影那样, 只要轧一脚就行, 华尔街有一句经过</p>

<p>Wall Street the old proverb has been reworded: give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach him how to arbitrage and you feed him forever.?(If, however, he studied at the Ivan Boesky School of Arbitrage, it may be a state institution that supplies his meals.)</p>	<p>改编的俗语，给一个人一条鱼，你只能养活他一餐，教他如何套利，却可以养活他一辈子，（当然要是他到学校学习套利，可能就要靠州政府过活了）</p>
<p>To evaluate arbitrage situations you must answer four questions: (1) How likely is it that the promised event will indeed occur? (2) How long will your money be tied up? (3) What chance is there that something still better will transpire – a competing takeover bid, for example? and (4) What will happen if the event does not take place because of anti-trust action, financing glitches, etc.?</p>	<p>在评估套利活动时，你必须能回答四个问题(1)已公布的事件有多少可能性确实会发生?(2)你的资金总计要投入多久?(3)有多少可能更好的结果会发生，例如购并竞价提高(4)因为反托拉斯或是财务意外状况发生导致购并案触礁的机率有多高?</p>
<p>Arcata Corp., one of our more serendipitous arbitrage experiences, illustrates the twists and turns of the business. On September 28, 1981 the directors of Arcata agreed in principle to sell the company to Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. (KKR), then and now a major leveraged-buy out firm. Arcata was in the printing and forest products businesses and had one other thing going for it: In 1978 the U.S. Government had taken title to 10,700 acres of Arcata timber, primarily old-growth redwood, to expand Redwood National Park. The government had paid \$97.9 million, in several installments, for this acreage, a sum Arcata was contesting as grossly inadequate. The parties also disputed the interest rate that should apply to the period between the taking of the property and final payment for it. The enabling legislation stipulated 6% simple interest; Arcata argued for a much higher and compounded rate.</p>	<p>Arcata 公司我们最曲折离奇的购并经验，说明了企业的曲曲折折，1981年9月28日该公司的董事同意将公司卖给KKR公司，一家在当时同时也是现在最大的融资买断公司，Arcata所从事的是印刷与森林产品，但其中值得注意的是在1978年美国政府决定征收该公司所有10,700公顷的红木林，以扩增国家公园的范围，为此政府决定分期支付该公司总金额9,790万美元的征收款，但Arcata公司却认为金额太少，同时双方也对适用的利率也争议，Arcata极力争取更高的赔偿金与适用的利率。</p>
<p>Buying a company with a highly-speculative, large-sized claim in litigation creates a negotiating problem, whether the claim is on behalf of or against the company. To solve this problem, KKR offered \$37.00 per Arcata share plus two-thirds of any additional amounts paid by the</p>	<p>买下一家具有高度争议的公司将会让公司在谈判过程中，会增加许多的难度，不管诉讼案件是不利或是有利于公司皆然，为了化解这个难题，KKR决定支付Arcata每股37美元再加上政府额外赔偿款的三分之二，作为购</p>

government for the redwood lands.	并的条件。
Appraising this arbitrage opportunity, we had to ask ourselves whether KKR would consummate the transaction since, among other things, its offer was contingent upon its obtaining satisfactory financing. A clause of this kind is always dangerous for the seller: It offers an easy exit for a suitor whose ardor fades between proposal and marriage. However, we were not particularly worried about this possibility because KKR past record for closing had been good.	在评估过这项投资机会之后，我们自问 KKR 能否真正完成这项交易的关键在于他们是否能够顺利取得融资，这对卖方来说永远是风险最高的一项条款，追求者在提出求婚到正式结婚的这段期间，要落跑是很容易的一件事，不过在这个案子我们却不太担心，原因在于 KKR 过去的记录还算不错。
We also had to ask ourselves what would happen if the KKR deal did fall through, and here we also felt reasonably comfortable: Arcata management and directors had been shopping the company for some time and were clearly determined to sell. If KKR went away, Arcata would likely find another buyer, though of course, the price might be lower.	我们还必须扪心自问若是 KKR 真的失败会如何，在这点我们觉得还好，Arcata 的董事会与经营阶层已经在外兜售好一段时间了，显示该公司却有决心要出售，如果 KKR 跑掉，Arcata 一定还会再找新的买主，当然届时的价格可能会差一点。
Finally, we had to ask ourselves what the redwood claim might be worth. Your Chairman, who can tell an elm from an oak, had no trouble with that one: He coolly evaluated the claim at somewhere between zero and a whole lot.	最后我们还必须问自己，那块红木林的价值到底有多少？坦白说我虽然个人连榆树跟橡木都分不出来，但对于这个问题我的处理方式倒很简单，反正就是介于零到一大笔钱之间就对了。
We started buying Arcata stock, then around \$33.50, on September 30 and in eight weeks purchased about 400,000 shares, or 5% of the company. The initial announcement said that the \$37.00 would be paid in January, 1982. Therefore, if everything had gone perfectly, we would have achieved an annual rate of return of about 40% – not counting the redwood claim, which would have been frosting.	后来我们开始从九月开始以每股 33.5 元买进 Arcata 股票，八个礼拜之内总共买进 40 万股，约占该公司 5% 的股权，隔年一月第一次对外公布股东每股可以拿到 37 元，换算年投资报酬约为 40%，这还不包含可以的红木林赔偿损失。
All did not go perfectly. In December it was announced that the closing would be delayed a bit. Nevertheless, a definitive agreement was signed on January 4. Encouraged, we raised our stake, buying at around \$38.00 per share and	然而过程中不太顺利，到了 12 月宣布交易可能会延后，尽管如果 1 月铁定会签约，受到这项鼓励，我们决定再加码以 38 元每股至 65.5 万股，约 7% 的股权，我们的努力终于获得回

<p>increasing our holdings to 655,000 shares, or over 7% of the company. Our willingness to pay up – even though the closing had been postponed – reflected our leaning toward whole lot?rather than ero?for the redwoods.</p>	<p>报，虽然有点拖延，但结果却相当令人满意。</p>
<p>Then, on February 25 the lenders said they were taking a econd look?at financing terms ?in view of the severely depressed housing industry and its impact on Arcata outlook.? The stockholders meeting was postponed again, to April. An Arcata spokesman said he id not think the fate of the acquisition itself was imperiled.?When arbitrageurs hear such reassurances, their minds flash to the old saying: e lied like a finance minister on the eve of devaluation.?</p>	<p>接着在 2 月 25 日融资银行说有鉴于房地产景气不佳，连带对 Arcata 的前景可能有所疑虑，故有关融资条件可能还要再谈，股东临时会也因此再度延期到四月举行，同时 Arcata 公司发言人表示他不认为购并案已触礁，但是当套利客听到这种重申时，脑中便闪过一句老话：他说谎的方式就好像是即将面临汇率崩盘的财政部长一样。</p>
<p>On March 12 KKR said its earlier deal wouldn work, first cutting its offer to \$33.50, then two days later raising it to \$35.00. On March 15, however, the directors turned this bid down and accepted another group offer of \$37.50 plus one-half of any redwood recovery. The shareholders okayed the deal, and the \$37.50 was paid on June 4.</p>	<p>3 月 12 日 KKR 宣布先前的约定无效，并将报价砍至 33.5 美元一股，两天后再调高至 35 美元，然而到了 3 月 15 日董事会拒绝了这项提议，并接受另一家集团 37.5 美元外加红木林一半的收益，股东会迅速通过这项交易，并于 6 月 4 日收到现金。</p>
<p>We received \$24.6 million versus our cost of \$22.9 million; our average holding period was close to six months. Considering the trouble this transaction encountered, our 15% annual rate of return excluding any value for the redwood claim – was more than satisfactory.</p>	<p>总计我们花了近六个月的时间，投资 2,290 万美元，最后收回 2,460 万美元，但若是加计这项交易中间所经历的风风雨雨，则 15% 的年报酬率 (未包含红木林潜在收益) 还算令人满意。</p>
<p>But the best was yet to come. The trial judge appointed two commissions, one to look at the timber value, the other to consider the interest rate questions. In January 1987, the first commission said the redwoods were worth \$275.7 million and the second commission recommended a compounded, blended rate of return working out to about 14%.</p>	<p>不过好戏还在后头，承审法院指派两个委员会来解决这项纷争，一个负责认定红木林的价值，一个则负责应该适用的利率，隔年 1 月委员会认定红木林的价值为 2.75 亿美元，适用的复利率应为 14%。</p>
<p>In August 1987 the judge upheld these</p>	<p>到了八月法官裁定这项决议，这代表</p>

<p>conclusions, which meant a net amount of about \$600 million would be due Arcata. The government then appealed. In 1988, though, before this appeal was heard, the claim was settled for \$519 million. Consequently, we received an additional \$29.48 per share, or about \$19.3 million. We will get another \$800,000 or so in 1989.</p>	<p>政府需要再支付高达 6 亿美元的赔偿金，联邦政府立刻提出上诉，而就在上诉即将宣判结果时，双方以 5.19 亿美元达成和解，因此我们又额外收到 1,930 万美元，相当于每股 29.48 美元的大红包，之后还可以再拿到 80 万美元的进帐。</p>
<p>Berkshire arbitrage activities differ from those of many arbitrageurs. First, we participate in only a few, and usually very large, transactions each year. Most practitioners buy into a great many deals perhaps 50 or more per year. With that many irons in the fire, they must spend most of their time monitoring both the progress of deals and the market movements of the related stocks. This is not how Charlie nor I wish to spend our lives. (What the sense in getting rich just to stare at a ticker tape all day?)</p>	<p>伯克希尔的套利活动与其它套利客有些不同，首先相较于一般套利客一年从事好几十个案子，每年我们只参与少数通常是大型的交易案，有这么多锅子同时在煮，他们必须花很多时间在监控交易的进度与相关股票的股价变动，这并不是查理跟我想要过的生活方式，(为了致富，整天盯着计算机屏幕到底有何意义?)</p>
<p>Because we diversify so little, one particularly profitable or unprofitable transaction will affect our yearly result from arbitrage far more than it will the typical arbitrage operation. So far, Berkshire has not had a really bad experience. But we will - and when it happens we I report the gory details to you.</p>	<p>也因为我们只专注在少数几个案子，所以一个特别好或是特别差的案子，可能会大大地影响到我们一整年的套利成绩，所幸到目前为止，伯克希尔还没有遇到什么惨痛的经验，一旦发生我一定会一五一十的向各位报告。</p>
<p>The other way we differ from some arbitrage operations is that we participate only in transactions that have been publicly announced. We do not trade on rumors or try to guess takeover candidates. We just read the newspapers, think about a few of the big propositions, and go by our own sense of probabilities.</p>	<p>另有一点不同的是我们只参与已经公开对外宣布的案子，我们不会仅靠着谣言或是去预测可能被购并的对象，我们只看报纸，思考几项关键因素，并依照我们判断的可能性做决定。</p>
<p>At yearend, our only major arbitrage position was 3,342,000 shares of RJR Nabisco with a cost of \$281.8 million and a market value of \$304.5 million. In January we increased our holdings to roughly four million shares and in February we eliminated our position. About three million shares were accepted when we tendered our</p>	<p>到了年底，我们剩下唯一的套利投资是 334.2 万股的 RJR Nabisco，投资成本 2.82 亿美元，目前市价 3.04 亿美元，今年一月我们增加持股到 400 万股，接着在二月全部出清。有 300 万股是 KKR 决定购并 RJR 后，我们卖给 KKR 的，获利 6,400 万美元略高于</p>

<p>holdings to KKR, which acquired RJR, and the returned shares were promptly sold in the market. Our pre-tax profit was a better-than-expected \$64 million.</p>	<p>预期。</p>
<p>Earlier, another familiar face turned up in the RJR bidding contest: Jay Pritzker, who was part of a First Boston group that made a tax-oriented offer. To quote Yogi Berra; it was deja vu all over again.?</p>	<p>稍早之前，另外一个竞争对手 Jay Pritzker-第一波士顿集团浮现加入对 RJR 的竞争行列，提出以租税规划为导向的提案，套句 Yogi Berra 的说法:这感觉识曾相识!</p>
<p>During most of the time when we normally would have been purchasers of RJR, our activities in the stock were restricted because of Salomon participation in a bidding group. Customarily, Charlie and I, though we are directors of Salomon, are walled off from information about its merger and acquisition work. We have asked that it be that way: The information would do us no good and could, in fact, occasionally inhibit Berkshire arbitrage operations.</p>	<p>大部分的时间我们买进 RJR 相当大的限制，由于我们在也是竞争者的所罗门公司有投资，虽然查理跟我都是所罗门的董事，但我们却与整个购并案的所有信息隔绝，而我们认为这样也好，额外的信息对我们不见得就有好处，事实上，有时还会妨碍到伯克希尔进行套利的投资。</p>
<p>However, the unusually large commitment that Salomon proposed to make in the RJR deal required that all directors be fully informed and involved. Therefore, Berkshire purchases of RJR were made at only two times: first, in the few days immediately following management announcement of buyout plans, before Salomon became involved; and considerably later, after the RJR board made its decision in favor of KKR. Because we could not buy at other times, our directorships cost Berkshire significant money.</p>	<p>然而由于所罗门的提案规模相当的大，以致于所有的董事都必须完全被知会并参与，因此伯克希尔总共只有两个时点可以进行买进 RJR 的动作，第一次是当 RJR 经营阶层宣布整个购并计划的几天内，当时所罗门还未宣布加入竞标，另外是后来 RJR 董事会决定优先考虑 KKR 的提案，也因为所罗门的董事职务，使得伯克希尔的投资成本大大提高。</p>
<p>Considering Berkshire good results in 1988, you might expect us to pile into arbitrage during 1989. Instead, we expect to be on the sidelines.</p>	<p>看到 1988 年如此丰硕的套利成果，你可能会觉得我们应该继续朝这方面加强，但事实上，我们决定采取观望的态度。</p>
<p>One pleasant reason is that our cash holdings are down - because our position in equities that we expect to hold for a very long time is substantially up. As regular readers of this</p>	<p>一个好的理由是因为我们决定大幅提高在长期股权方面的投资，所以目前的现金水位已经下降，常常读我们年报的人可能都知道，我们的决定不</p>

<p>report know, our new commitments are not based on a judgment about short-term prospects for the stock market. Rather, they reflect an opinion about long-term business prospects for specific companies. We do not have, never have had, and never will have an opinion about where the stock market, interest rates, or business activity will be a year from now.</p>	<p>是基于短期股市的表现，反而我们注重的是个别企业的长期经济展望，我们从来没有、以后也不会对短期股市、利率或企业活动做任何的评论。</p>
<p>Even if we had a lot of cash we probably would do little in arbitrage in 1989. Some extraordinary excesses have developed in the takeover field. As Dorothy says: oto, I have a feeling we e not in Kansas any more.?</p>	<p>然而就算是我们现金满满，我们在1989年可能也不会从事太多的套利交易，购并市场的发展已经有点过头了，就像桃乐斯所说的：“奥图，我觉得我们好象已经不是在堪萨斯市了！”</p>
<p>We have no idea how long the excesses will last, nor do we know what will change the attitudes of government, lender and buyer that fuel them. But we do know that the less the prudence with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the prudence with which we should conduct our own affairs. We have no desire to arbitrage transactions that reflect the unbridled - and, in our view, often unwarranted - optimism of both buyers and lenders. In our activities, we will heed the wisdom of Herb Stein: f something can go on forever, it will end.?</p>	<p>我们不太确定这种过热的现象会持续多久，包含参与热潮的政府、金主与买家的态度会如何转变，不过我们可以确定的是，当别人越没有信心参与这些活动时，我们的信心也就越高，我们不愿意参与那些反应买方与金主无可救药的乐观，通常我们认为那是无保障的，在此我们宁愿注重Herb Stein的智能，若一件事不能持久不衰，那么它终将结束。</p>
<p>Efficient Market Theory</p>	<p>效率市场理论</p>
<p>The preceding discussion about arbitrage makes a small discussion of fficient market theory?(EMT) also seem relevant. This doctrine became highly fashionable - indeed, almost holy scripture in academic circles during the 1970s. Essentially, it said that analyzing stocks was useless because all public information about them was appropriately reflected in their prices. In other words, the market always knew everything. As a corollary, the professors who taught EMT said that someone throwing darts at the stock tables could select a stock portfolio having prospects just as good as one selected by</p>	<p>前面提到的套利活动使得我们有必要讨论一下市场效率理论，这理论在近年来变得非常热门，尤其在1970年代的学术圈被奉为圣旨，基本上它认为分析股票是没有用的，因为所有公开的信息皆已反应在其股价之上，换句话说，市场永远知道所有的事，学校教市场效率理论的教授因此做了一个推论，比喻说任何一个人射飞镖随机所选出来的股票组合可以媲美，华尔街最聪明、最努力的证券分析师所选出来的投资组合，令人惊讶的是市场效率理论不但为学术界所</p>

<p>the brightest, most hard-working security analyst. Amazingly, EMT was embraced not only by academics, but by many investment professionals and corporate managers as well. Observing correctly that the market was <i>frequently</i> efficient, they went on to conclude incorrectly that it was <i>always</i> efficient. The difference between these propositions is night and day.</p>	<p>拥抱，更被许多投资专家与企业经理人所接受，正确地观察到市场往往是具有效率的，他们却继续下了错误的结论，市场永远都具有效率，这中间的假设差异，简直有天壤之别。</p>
<p>In my opinion, the continuous 63-year arbitrage experience of Graham-Newman Corp. Buffett Partnership, and Berkshire illustrates just how foolish EMT is. (There plenty of other evidence, also.) While at Graham-Newman, I made a study of its earnings from arbitrage during the entire 1926-1956 lifespan of the company. Unleveraged returns averaged 20% per year. Starting in 1956, I applied Ben Graham arbitrage principles, first at Buffett Partnership and then Berkshire. Though I e not made an exact calculation, I have done enough work to know that the 1956-1988 returns averaged well over 20%. (Of course, I operated in an environment far more favorable than Ben ; he had 1929-1932 to contend with.)</p>	<p>就我个人的看法，就我个人过去在葛拉罕-纽曼公司、巴菲特合伙企业与伯克希尔公司连续 63 年的套利经验，说明了效率市场理论有多么的愚蠢（当然还有其它一堆证据），当初在葛拉罕-纽曼公司上班时，我将该公司 1926 年到 1956 年的套利成果做了一番研究，每年平均 20% 的投资报酬率，之后从 1956 年开始我在巴菲特合伙企业与之后的伯克希尔公司，运用葛拉罕的套利原则，虽然我并没有仔细地去看，但 1956 年到 1988 年间的投资报酬率应该也有超过 20%，（当然之后的投资环境比起葛拉罕当时要好的许多，因为当时他遇到过 1929-1932 年的景气大萧条）。</p>
<p>All of the conditions are present that are required for a fair test of portfolio performance: (1) the three organizations traded hundreds of different securities while building this 63-year record; (2) the results are not skewed by a few fortunate experiences; (3) we did not have to dig for obscure facts or develop keen insights about products or managements - we simply acted on highly-publicized events; and (4) our arbitrage positions were a clearly identified universe - they have not been selected by hindsight.</p>	<p>所有的条件皆以具备来公平测试投资组合的表现(1)三个公司 63 年来买卖了上百种不同的股票证券(2)结果应该不会因为某个特别好的个案所扭曲(3)我们不需要故意隐瞒事实或是宣扬我们的产品优秀或是经营者眼光独到，我们只是从事高度公开的个案(4)我们的套利部份可以很容易就被追查到，他们并不是事后才特别挑选出来的</p>
<p>Over the 63 years, the general market delivered just under a 10% annual return, including dividends. That means \$1,000 would have grown to \$405,000 if all income had been reinvested. A 20% rate of return, however, would have produced \$97</p>	<p>过去 63 年来，大盘整体的投资报酬（加计股利）大概只有 10%，意思是说若当初投入 1,000 美元的话，现在可以获得 405,000 美元，但是若投资报酬率改为 20% 的话，现在却会变成</p>

<p>million. That strikes us as a statistically-significant differential that might, conceivably, arouse one curiosity.</p>	<p>9,700 万美元，统计上如此大的差异使得我们不禁好奇的想要怀疑，然而理论支持者从来就不会去注意理论与现实如此地不相符，确实现在他们讲话已不如过去那么大声，但据我所知却没有任何一个人愿意承认错误，不管他们已经误导了多少个学生，市场效率理论还是继续在各个企管名校间列为投资课程的重要教材之一，很显然的，死不悔改、甚而曲解神意，不是只有神学家才做的出来。</p>
<p>Yet proponents of the theory have never seemed interested in discordant evidence of this type. True, they don't talk quite as much about their theory today as they used to. But no one, to my knowledge, has ever said he was wrong, no matter how many thousands of students he has sent forth misinstructed. EMT, moreover, continues to be an integral part of the investment curriculum at major business schools. Apparently, a reluctance to recant, and thereby to demystify the priesthood, is not limited to theologians. Naturally the disservice done students and gullible investment professionals who have swallowed EMT has been an extraordinary service to us and other followers of Graham. In any sort of a contest - financial, mental, or physical - it is an enormous advantage to have opponents who have been taught that it is useless to even try. From a selfish point of view, Grahamites should probably endow chairs to ensure the perpetual teaching of EMT.</p>	<p>自然而然，这些遇人不淑的学生与被骗的投资专家在接受市场效率理论后，对于我们与其它葛拉罕的追随者实在有莫大的帮助，在任何的竞赛中，不管是投资、心智或是体能方面，要是遇到对手被告知思考与尝试是没有用的，对我们来说等于是占尽了优势，从一个自私的观点来看，葛拉罕学派应该祈祷市场效率理论能够在校园中永为流传。</p>
<p>All this said, a warning is appropriate. Arbitrage has looked easy recently. But this is not a form of investing that guarantees profits of 20% a year or, for that matter, profits of any kind. As noted, the market is reasonably efficient much of the time: For every arbitrage opportunity we seized in that 63-year period, many more were foregone because they seemed properly-priced.</p>	<p>说了那么多，最后还是要提出一个警告，最近套利看起来相当容易，但它却不是永远都保证有 20% 报酬的投资活动，现在的市场比起过去来的有效率许多，除了我们过去 63 年所真正掌握的套利活动之外，还有更多是因为价格合理而因此被舍弃掉的。</p>

<p>An investor cannot obtain superior profits from stocks by simply committing to a specific investment category or style. He can earn them only by carefully evaluating facts and continuously exercising discipline. Investing in arbitrage situations, per se, is no better a strategy than selecting a portfolio by throwing darts.</p>	<p>一个投资者很难只靠单一一种投资类别或投资风格而创造超人的利益，他只能靠着仔细评估事实并持续地遵照原则才能赚取超额利润，就套利投资本身而言，并没有比选择利用飞镖选股的策略好到哪里去。</p>
<p>New York Stock Exchange Listing</p>	<p>纽约证券交易所挂牌</p>
<p>Berkshire shares were listed on the New York Stock Exchange on November 29, 1988. On pages 50-51 we reproduce the letter we sent to shareholders concerning the listing.</p>	<p>伯克希尔的股份于 1988 年 11 月 29 日正式在纽约证券交易所挂牌，后面附有我们写给股东有关挂牌的正式声明。</p>
<p>Let me clarify one point not dealt with in the letter: Though our round lot for trading on the NYSE is ten shares, any number of shares from one on up can be bought or sold.</p>	<p>除了那封信之外，我个人还有一点要说明，虽然我们在交易所的基本交易单位是 10 股，但只要是 1 股以上还是一样可以进行买卖。</p>
<p>As the letter explains, our primary goal in listing was to reduce transaction costs, and we believe this goal is being achieved. Generally, the spread between the bid and asked price on the NYSE has been well below the spread that prevailed in the over-the-counter market.</p>	<p>另外如同信中所提到的，我们之所以决定挂牌的主要目的是要降低交易成本，而我相信这目的也已经达到，一般来说，在 NYSE 买卖之间的价差会比在柜台买卖要来得小的多。</p>
<p>Henderson Brothers, Inc., the specialist in our shares, is the oldest continuing specialist firm on the Exchange; its progenitor, William Thomas Henderson, bought his seat for \$500 on September 8, 1861. (Recently, seats were selling for about \$625,000.) Among the 54 firms acting as specialists, HBI ranks second in number of stocks assigned, with 83. We were pleased when Berkshire was allocated to HBI, and have been delighted with the firm performance. Jim Maguire, Chairman of HBI, personally manages the trading in Berkshire, and we could not be in better hands.</p>	<p>负责买卖伯克希尔股份的是 Henderson 兄弟公司-交易所中一家老牌专家，它的前身 William Thomas Henderson，是在 1861 年以 500 块美金买下一个交易所的席位(最近一个席位的成交价大约是 62.5 万美金)，在所有 54 家交易公司当中，HBI 共被分配到第二多的 83 种股票，我们很高兴伯克希尔能够被分配给 HBI 负责交易，到目前为止对于他们的服务感到相当满意，该公司负责人 Jim Maguire 亲自负责伯克希尔的交易，他是我们可以找到的最佳人选。</p>
<p>In two respects our goals probably differ</p>	<p>有两点是我们与其它挂牌公司最大</p>

<p>somewhat from those of most listed companies. First, we do not want to maximize the price at which Berkshire shares trade. We wish instead for them to trade in a narrow range centered at intrinsic business value (which we hope increases at a reasonable - or, better yet, unreasonable - rate). Charlie and I are bothered as much by significant overvaluation as significant undervaluation. Both extremes will inevitably produce results for many shareholders that will differ sharply from Berkshire business results. If our stock price instead consistently mirrors business value, each of our shareholders will receive an investment result that roughly parallels the business results of Berkshire during his holding period.</p>	<p>不同的地方，第一我们不希望伯克希尔的股价过高，主要是希望它能够反应的实质价值范围内交易(当然我们希望实质价值能够以合理的速度增加，当然能够不合理的增加更好)，查理跟我都不希望，股价被过分高估或是被过分低估，两者都会使伯克希尔的股东的获利与公司本身经营获利状况不相当，所以如果伯克希尔的股价持续地反应企业实质的价值，则我们可以确定每个股东在他持有公司股份的期间所获得的利益，都能与公司本身营运的获利成等比。</p>
<p>Second, we wish for very little trading activity. If we ran a private business with a few passive partners, we would be disappointed if those partners, and their replacements, frequently wanted to leave the partnership. Running a public company, we feel the same way.</p>	<p>第二我们希望交易量越少越好，如果我们经营的是一家只有几位合伙人的私人企业，我们也不希望合伙人时常进进出出合伙事业，经营一家公开上市公司也是同样的道理。</p>
<p>Our goal is to attract long-term owners who, at the time of purchase, have no timetable or price target for sale but plan instead to stay with us indefinitely. We don't understand the CEO who wants lots of stock activity, for that can be achieved only if many of his owners are constantly exiting. At what other organization - school, club, church, etc. - do leaders cheer when members leave? (However, if there were a broker whose livelihood depended upon the membership turnover in such organizations, you could be sure that there would be at least one proponent of activity, as in: here hasn't been much going on in Christianity for a while; maybe we should switch to Buddhism next week.?)</p>	<p>我们希望能够吸引具有远见的投资人，在买进股份时，抱着打算与我们永远同在而不是订有卖出价格的时间表，我们实在不能理解为何有公司的CEO希望自己公司的股份交易量越多越好，这代表公司的股东组合会变来变去，在其它如学校、俱乐部、教堂等社会机构当中，没有主持人希望自己的组织成员离开的，(然而偏偏就有营业员就是要靠着说服成员离开组织来维生，你有没有听过有人劝你反正最近基督教也没有什么搞头，不如下礼拜大家改信佛教试一试)。</p>
<p>Of course, some Berkshire owners will need or want to sell from time to time, and we wish for good replacements who will pay them a fair price. Therefore we try, through our policies,</p>	<p>当然还是有些伯克希尔股东需要或是想要偶尔把他持有的股份卖掉，而我们希望能够找到合适的人以适当的价格来接手，因此我们试着透过我</p>

<p>performance, and communications, to attract new shareholders who understand our operations, share our time horizons, and measure us as we measure ourselves. If we can continue to attract this sort of shareholder - and, just as important, can continue to be uninteresting to those with short-term or unrealistic expectations - Berkshire shares should consistently sell at prices reasonably related to business value.</p>	<p>们的政策、表现与沟通,吸引真正了解我们营运、认同我们理念并用同样的方式来对待我们的新股东,如果我们能够持续地吸引这种类型的股东,同时很重要的,让那些短视近利的投资人远离我们,相信伯克希尔一定能够持续地以合理的价格交易买卖。</p>
<p>David L. Dodd</p>	<p>大卫·陶德</p>
<p>Dave Dodd, my friend and teacher for 38 years, died last year at age 93. Most of you don't know of him. Yet any long-time shareholder of Berkshire is appreciably wealthier because of the indirect influence he had upon our company.</p>	<p>与我相交 38 年亦师亦友的大卫·陶德,于去年以高龄 93 岁过世,大多数的人可能都不知道他是谁,但是许多伯克希尔的老股东却因为他对本公司的间接影响而受益良多。</p>
<p>Dave spent a lifetime teaching at Columbia University, and he co-authored <i>Security Analysis</i> with Ben Graham. From the moment I arrived at Columbia, Dave personally encouraged and educated me; one influence was as important as the other. Everything he taught me, directly or through his book, made sense. Later, through dozens of letters, he continued my education right up until his death.</p>	<p>大卫终其一生在哥伦比亚大学教书,同时他也与葛拉罕合作著述“证券分析”一书,自从我到哥伦比亚之后,大卫不时地鼓励与教导我,给我的影响一个接着一个,他所教导我的很一件事,不论是直接或透过他的著作都非常有道理,后来毕业后,透过不断往来的信件,他给我的教育持续到他逝世之前。</p>
<p>I have known many professors of finance and investments but I have never seen any, except for Ben Graham, who was the match of Dave. The proof of his talent is the record of his students: No other teacher of investments has sent forth so many who have achieved unusual success.</p>	<p>我认识许多财经与投资学的教授,除了葛拉罕以外,没有人可以比得上大卫,最好的证明就是他学生的成绩,没有其它投资学的教授可以造就出那么多杰出的英才。</p>
<p>When students left Dave's classroom, they were equipped to invest intelligently for a lifetime because the principles he taught were simple, sound, useful, and enduring. Though these may appear to be unremarkable virtues, the teaching of principles embodying them has been rare.</p>	<p>当学生离开大卫的教室,就代表着他们一生将具备有投资智能,因为他所教导的原则是如此的简单、完整有用且持久,虽然这些特点看起来并不显著,但要将这些原则教导给学生却不是一件容易的事。</p>
<p>It is particularly impressive that Dave could</p>	<p>让我印象最深刻的是大卫总是言行</p>

<p>practice as well as preach. just as Keynes became wealthy by applying his academic ideas to a very small purse, so, too, did Dave. Indeed, his financial performance far outshone that of Keynes, who began as a market-timer (leaning on business and credit-cycle theory) and converted, after much thought, to value investing. Dave was right from the start.</p>	<p>一致，就像凯恩斯运用自己研究出的学术观点来致富，大卫也是如此。事实上他在财务操作上的表现远比凯恩斯来得出色，凭借着企业与信用循环理论，之后再演变成价值投资，大卫一开始就选择了正确的方向。</p>
<p>In Berkshire investments, Charlie and I have employed the principles taught by Dave and Ben Graham. Our prosperity is the fruit of their intellectual tree.</p>	<p>查理跟我运用大卫与葛拉罕所教的原则，在伯克希尔的投资之上，我们的成功正代表着他们心血的结晶。</p>
<p>Miscellaneous</p>	<p>其它事项</p>
<p>We hope to buy more businesses that are similar to the ones we have, and we can use some help. If you have a business that fits the following criteria, call me or, preferably, write.</p>	<p>我们希望能够买进更多像我们现在拥有一样的企业，当然我们可以透过大家的协助，如果你拥有符合以下条件的企业，记得打电话或者是写信告诉我，</p>
<p>Here what we are looking for:(1) large purchases (at least \$10 million of after-tax earnings), (2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are turnaround situations), (3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt, (4) management in place (we can supply it), (5) simple businesses (if there lots of technology, we won't understand it), (6) an offering price (we don't want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown). We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we are interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give.</p>	<p>我们想找(1)巨额交易(每年税后盈余至少有一千万美元)(2)持续稳定获利(我们对有远景或具转机的公司没兴趣)(3)高股东报酬率(并且甚少举债)(4)具备管理阶层(我们无法提供)(5)简单的企业(若牵涉到太多高科技,我们弄不懂)(6)合理的价格(在价格不确定前,我们不希望浪费自己与对方太多时间)我们不会进行敌意的购并,并承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣(通常不超过五分钟),我们倾向采现金交易,除非我们所换得的内含价值跟我们付出的一样多,否则不考虑发行股份。</p>
<p>Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the Blumkin-Friedman-Heldman mold. In cases like</p>	<p>我们最喜欢的交易对象之一是像B太太-Heldman家族那样,公司经营者</p>

<p>these, the company owner-managers wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves, but often for their families or inactive shareholders. However, these managers also wish to remain significant owners who continue to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit for owners with these objectives and invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past.</p>	<p>希望能马上有一大笔现金，不管是给自己、家人或是其它股东，最好这些经营者如往常一样能够继续留在公司，我想我们可以提供具有以上想法的经营者，一个满意的方式，我们也欢迎可能的卖方与那些过去与我们合作过的对象打听。</p>
<p>Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don't come close to meeting our tests: We've found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. Our interest in new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales can best be expressed by another Goldwynism: please include me out.?</p>	<p>另一方面我们也持续接到一些不符合我们条件的询问，包括新事业、转机股、拍卖案以及最常见的中介案。我们发现如果你登广告要买牧羊犬，结果却有一大堆人打电话来要卖你长耳猎犬，在此重申我们对这些交易，只有高德温的另一句话可以形容，请把我排除在外。</p>
<p>Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in Cap Cities and Salomon. We have a special interest in purchasing convertible preferreds as a long-term investment, as we did at Salomon.</p>	<p>除了以上买下整家公司的购并案外，我们也会考虑买进一大部份不具控制权的股份，就像我们在资本城与所罗门这两个 Case 一样，尤其是我们对于像这次购买所罗门一样的可转换特别股当作长期投资特别有兴趣。</p>
<p>We received some good news a few weeks ago: Standard & Poor raised our credit rating to AAA, which is the highest rating it bestows. Only 15 other U.S. industrial or property-casualty companies are rated AAA, down from 28 in 1980.</p>	<p>几个礼拜以前，我们收到了一个好消息，史坦普评等机构将我们的债信等级调高的三 A 的最高标准，相较于 1980 年的 28 家，目前全美只有 15 家公司可以拥有此殊荣。</p>
<p>Corporate bondholders have taken their lumps in the past few years from event risk. This term refers to the overnight degradation of credit that accompanies a heavily-leveraged purchase or recapitalization of a business whose financial policies, up to then, had been conservative. In a world of takeovers inhabited by few owner-managers, most corporations present such</p>	<p>过去几年企业公司债的持有人在事件风险上跌了一大跤，意思是说一家原本财务操作保守的公司，因为进行高杠杆购并或是重整再造，使得公司在一夜之间被大幅调降信用评等，购并的世界之中，除了少数经营权与所有权一致的公司之外，大部分的公司都会面临这样的风险，但伯克希尔绝</p>

<p>a risk. Berkshire does not. Charlie and I promise bondholders the same respect we afford shareholders.</p>	<p>对不会，查理跟我保证给债券持有人与股东一样的承诺。</p>
<p>About 97.4% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire 1988 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were \$5 million, and 2,319 charities were recipients. If we achieve reasonable business results, we plan to increase the per-share contributions in 1989.</p>	<p>大约有97.4%的有效股权参与1988年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约500万美元捐出的款项分配给2,319家慈善机构，若经营情况许可，我们计划在1989年扩大这项捐赠计划。</p>
<p>We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 48-49. If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on September 30, 1989 will be ineligible for the 1989 program.</p>	<p>我们敦促新加入的股东，仔细阅读年报上有关股东捐赠计划的详细内容，如果在未来年度内，你想要参加这类的计划，我们强烈建议你将股份登记在自己而不是受托人的名下，必须在1989年9月30日之前完成登记，才有权利参与1989年的计划。</p>
<p>Berkshire annual meeting will be held in Omaha on Monday, April 24, 1989, and I hope you will come. The meeting provides the forum for you to ask any owner-related questions you may have, and we will keep answering until all (except those dealing with portfolio activities or other proprietary information) have been dealt with.</p>	<p>今年的股东会将在1989年4月24日星期一在奥玛哈举行，我们希望大家都能来参加，这个会议提供一个场所让你能够提出任何与股东有关的问题，我们会一直回答到所有股东都满意为止(除了那些想要知道投资组合明牌或是内线消息的人)</p>
<p>After the meeting we will have several buses available to take you to visit Mrs. B at The Nebraska Furniture Mart and Ike Friedman at Borsheim . Be prepared for bargains.</p>	<p>会后我们将安排几台巴士载着有兴趣的股东到B太太的家具广场与波仙珠宝店，准备大捡便宜货吧！</p>
<p>Out-of-towners may prefer to arrive early and visit Mrs. B during the Sunday store hours of noon to five. (These Sunday hours seem ridiculously short to Mrs. B, who feels they scarcely allow her time to warm up; she much prefers the days on which the store remains open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m.) Borsheims, however, is not open on Sunday.</p>	<p>外地来的股东可以选择提早一点来，B太太的店星期天会从中午开到下午五点，只有五个小时可能不够B太太暖身，她可能希望还是能够像平日一样从早上10点到晚上9点，另外波仙珠宝星期天并不开门营业。</p>

<p>Ask Mrs. B the secret of her astonishingly low carpet prices. She will confide to you - as she does to everyone - how she does it: can sell so cheap ause I work for this dummy who doesn't know anything about carpet.?</p>	<p>记得问 B 太太地毯价格为什么会如此便宜的秘密，她一定会向跟所有人一样地偷偷跟你讲她是如何办到的，（我之所以能够卖的这么便宜是因为我的老板对于地毯根本就一无所知！）</p>
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